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Abstract
The Note argues that the Fed’s approach in applying the BHCA to foreign government in-
strumentalities incorrectly characterizes them as “companies” under the Act. It further argues that
the Fed’s approach to regulating foreign government owned subsidiaries in the U.S. insufficiently
accomodaets the financial interrelationship between these governments U.S. banking affiliates and
their non-banking activities outside the U.S. The Note argues that the Fed has incorrectly charac-
terized foreign banking instrumentalities as ”companies”, and therefore would excessively restrict
their financial interrelationships in the event these instrumentalities acquire a U.S. subsidiary.
NOTES
THE APPLICATION OF THE U.S. BANK HOLDING
COMPANY ACT TO INSTRUMENTALITIES OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Bank Holding Company Act (the "BHCA" or the
"Act")' regulates the activities of bank holding companies, pri-
marily by restricting the non-banking activities of such compa-
nies to activities closely related to banking.2 Foreign govern-
ments often function in a manner similar to bank holding com-
panies. Such "foreign government instrumentalities" may take
the form of government-operated central banks, or they may
hold shares in banks either directly or through government
holding instrumentalities.3  These foreign government con-
trolled banking organizations have maintained agencies or
branches in the United States, and have sometimes acquired
banks there.4 Traditionally, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
1. The Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841-1850 (1988) [hereinafter
"the BHCA" or "the Act"].
2. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). Section 4(c)(8) provides an exemption
from the non-banking restrictions of BHCA section 4 for "shares of any company the
activities of which the Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing has deter-
mined [by order or regulation] to be so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." Id.
3. See generally S. KHAN, NATIONALIZED BANKING & ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT 1-32
(1970). Khan discusses the role of nationalized banking in economic development,
and notes that
[t]he banking system thus becomes an important instrument of economic
development in capitalist as well as socialist economies. Its importance in-
creases all the more in a mixed economy like that of India. In this type of
economic system, planning is largely of the indicative, persuasive type,
"planning by inducement," as it is called. The market mechanism retains
most of the characteristics which it had in a capitalist system. Moreover,
private enterprise continues to be a major sector. Consequently, it makes
[the] banking system a very important instrument in economic development
if its working is based on social objective rather than private profit motive.
Id. at 22; see S. HOLLAND, THE STATE As ENTREPRENEUR 242-65 (1972) (discussing
state investment companies and their activities).
4. See Staff Memorandum: A Technical Analysis of Some Implications of Apply-
ing The Bank Holding Company Act to Foreign Government Entities, submitted by
letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board to Doug Bar-
nard, Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of
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(the "Board"), which administers the BHCA,5 has not applied
the BHCA to foreign government instrumentalities because
the Act's definition of "company" does not explicitly include
foreign government instrumentalities which own banks. 6 Re-
cently, however, the Board has indicated that it would include
foreign government instrumentalities under the Act's defini-
tion of "company" and would, accordingly, apply the BHCA to
foreign government instrumentalities owning U.S. banks.7
This Note argues that the Board's approach in applying
the BHCA to foreign government instrumentalities incorrectly
characterizes them as "companies" under the Act. This Note
further argues that the Board's approach to regulating foreign
government-owned subsidiaries in the United States insuffi-
ciently accommodates the financial interrelationship between
these governments' U.S. banking affiliates and their non-bank-
ing activities outside the United States. Part I sets forth the
history of the BHCA's regulatory scheme addressing foreign
banks, culminating in the International Banking Act's amend-
ments of the BHCA regarding foreign banking activities in the
United States. Part II analyzes Board practice in relation to
foreign government instrumentalities that operate banks in the
United States. Part III argues that the Board has incorrectly
characterized foreign government banking instrumentalities as
"companies," and therefore would excessively restrict their fi-
nancial interrelationships in the event these instrumentalities
acquire a U.S. subsidiary. This Note concludes that a uniform
statutory approach to these issues is the appropriate mecha-
the House Committee on Government Operations, at Attachment B (Oct. 28, 1983)
[hereinafter 1983 Staff Memorandum].
5. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 43, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1988) and scattered sections of Titles 12, 15, and 18);
see generally B. BECKHART, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (1972) (describing functions
of Federal Reserve System). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
is the U.S. institution analogous to a central bank, operating through a method of
supervision over twelve regional Federal Reserve banks, and manages central bank-
ing functions of monetary control and supervises banks and bank holding companies
under various statutory authorities. Id. at 29-51.
6. See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
7. See Letter from William Wiles, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to Patricia S.
Skigen, Esq. andJohn B. Cairns, Esq. (Aug. 19, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 BCI Letter].
In the 1988 BCI Letter, the Board announced its intent to require IRI, an Italian
government-owned holding instrumentality, to make a BHCA application before ac-
quiring Irving Bank Company of New York. Id.
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nism to accommodate the sovereignty questions raised by the
application of the BHCA to foreign governments.
I. THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
AND FOREIGN BANKS
A. History and Operation of the Bank Holding Company Act
Congress first recognized the need to regulate holding
companies that control banks in the banking statutes enacted
during the Great Depression of the 1930s.1 The Banking Act
of 1933,1 commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, required
bank holding companies to obtain a permit and submit to an
examination by the Board before exercising their voting rights
in stock holdings of subsidiary Federal Reserve member
banks.' o Between 1938 and 1955, Congress made several at-
tempts to create a statute that would regulate the activities of
bank holding companies." In 1956, such a law was enacted:
the Bank Holding Company Act.' 2
In its amended form, the BHCA still regulates bank hold-
ing company activities' 3 by limiting the non-banking activities
and financial interrelationships of affiliates within holding
8. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3-4 (1955), reprinted in 1956
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2482, 2484-85 (describing history of legislative
initiatives between 1938 and 1956, leading to the Bank Holding Company Act) [here-
inafter 1955 SENATE REPORT].
9. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251 (1913), as amended Pub. L. No.
66, § 19, 48 Stat. 186 (1933); see H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1955)
(discussion of Federal Reserve Act's voting requirements) [hereinafter 1955 HousE
REPORT].
10. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 66, § 19, 48 Stat. 186 (1933).
11. See 1955 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-4 (describing initiatives leading
to the BHCA). Those initiatives began in 1938, when President Roosevelt, in a spe-
cial message to Congress, urged that the legislature enact legislation that would con-
trol the operation of bank holding companies, to prevent holding companies from
acquiring any more banks, to prevent bank holding company owned banks from es-
tablishing any more branches, and to make it illegal for a bank holding company to
borrow from or to sell securities to a bank in which it holds stock. Id. at 2384. Sena-
tor Glass introduced a bill in response to this suggestion, but the bill failed to get out
of committee. Id. In 1941, 1945, 1947, 1949, and 1953, efforts were made to intro-
duce similar legislation. Id. at 2384-85. Finally, in 1955, Senator Capehart and
others introduced S. 880, which after modifications, was passed on May 9, 1956. Id.
at 2385.
12. Pub. L. No. 511, ch. 240, § 2 et seq., 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
13. Id.
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companies, and by limiting interstate branching. 4 The
BHCA's objectives are to control the creation and expansion
of bank holding companies, to separate their business of man-
aging and controlling banks from their unrelated business, to
maintain competition among banks, and to minimize the dan-
gers resulting from concentration of economic power in cen-
tralized control of banks. 5 In addition, the BHCA subjects
bank holding companies to Federal Reserve Board examina-
tion and regulation.' 6 To implement these goals, the original
version of the BHCA required that existing bank holding com-
panies divest themselves of non-banking holdings within two
years of the Act's effective date.' 7 Section 4(c) (8) of the BHCA
and its implementing regulations limit bank holding compa-
nies' non-banking activities to those "closely related to bank-
ing ... [and] a proper incident thereto."'" The 1956 BHCA
also contained a flat prohibition on lending from subsidiary
banks to their parent bank holding companies, a practice often
referred to as "upstream lending."' 9 A 1966 amendment to
the Act eliminated this blanket prohibition;20 lending is now
allowed within the limits specified in section 23A of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act. 2'
Section 23A limits lending between bank holding com-
pany affiliates and affiliates that are Federal Reserve member
banks or insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988) (non-banking restrictions of the Act); 12
C.F.R. § 225.25 (1989) (Board regulations implementing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1988)); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988) (limitations on interstate branching); 12 U.S.C.
§ 371 (c) (1988) (limitations on interaffiliate lending). For the text of section 23A, see
infra note 23.
15. 1955 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-12.
16, See 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (1988) (role of Federal Reserve Board in regulating
bank holding companies).
17. See 1955 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 16-17.
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988); see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1989) (listing
specific activities Federal Reserve Board considers "closely related to banking").
19. Pub. L. 511, ch. 240, § 6, 70 Stat. at 137-38 (1956), see 1955 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 9 at 17-19 (1956) (prohibiting against upstream and cross-stream credit).
20. See Pub. L. No. 89-485, §§ 12a, 13h, 80 Stat. 241, 243 (1966) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1) (1988)).
21. The Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988). This section is applica-
ble to all Federal Reserve member banks, and is also applicable to all banks insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See Federal Deposit Insurance Com-
pany Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (1988) (regulations governing depository institutions
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
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tion.22 Under section 23A, loans to any single affiliate are lim-
ited to ten percent, and loans to all affiliates to twenty percent,
of the bank's capital stock and surplus.23 Section 23A also im-
22. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(l)(A)-(C) (1988) (affiliates of bank holding companies
covered by section 23A); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (1988) (Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration insured banks covered by section 23A's lending restrictions).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(4) (1988). Section 23A limits intra-company lending
as follows:
(A) in the case of any affiliate, the aggregate amount of covered transac-
tions of the member bank and its subsidiaries will not exceed 10 per centum
of the capital stock and surplus of the member bank; and
(B) in the case of all affiliates, the aggregate amount of covered transac-
tions of the member banks and its subsidiaries will not exceed 20 per cen-
tum of the capital stock and surplus of the member bank.
(2) For the purpose of this section, any transaction by a member bank with
any person shall be deemed to be a transaction with an affiliate to the extent
that the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit of, or trans-
ferred to, that affiliate.
(3) A member bank and its subsidiaries may not purchase a low-quality asset
from an affiliate unless the bank or such subsidiary, pursuant to an in-
dependent credit evaluation, committed itself to purchase such asset prior
to the time such asset was acquired by the affiliate.
(4) Any covered transactions ... shall be on terms and conditions that are
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.
Id
"Affiliate" as used in the context of section 23A is defined as follows:
(1) [T]he term "affiliate" with respect to a member bank means-
(A) any company that controls the member bank and any other com-
pany that is controlled by the company that controls the member bank;
(B) a bank subsidiary of the member bank;
(C) any company-
(i) that is controlled directly or indirectly, by a trust or otherwise, by
or for the benefit of shareholders who beneficially or otherwise con-
trol, directly or indirectly, by trust or otherwise, the member bank
or any company that controls the member bank; or
(ii) in which a majority of its directors or trustees constitute a ma-
jority of the persons holding any such office with the member bank
or any company that controls the member bank;
(E) any company that the board determines by regulation or order to
have a relationship with the member bank.., such that covered transactions
by the member bank or its subsidiary with that company may be affected by
the relationship to the detriment of the member bank or its subsidiary ....
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1) (1988).
"Company" as used in section 23A, is defined as "a corporation, partnership,
business trust, association, or similar organization and, unless specifically excluded,
the term 'company' includes a 'member bank' and a 'bank'." 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(6)
(1988).
"Control" as used in section 23A, is defined as follows:
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poses collateral requirements on interaffiliate transactions. 4
Section 23B, added to the Federal Reserve Act in 1987, im-
poses further restrictions on interaffiliate lending.25 Under
section 23B, a wide range of transactions between affiliates
must be at non-preferential terms, including sales of securities
and assets to affiliates, and brokerage transactions. 26 The pur-
(3)(A) a company or shareholder shall be deemed to have control over an-
other company if-
(i) such company or shareholder, directly or indirectly, or acting
through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25
per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the other company;
(ii) such company or shareholder controls in any manner the election of
a majority of the directors or trustees of the other company; or
(iii) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
that such company or shareholder, directly or indirectly, exercises a control-
ling influence over the management or policies of the other company ....
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(3)(A) (1988).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(c)(l)-(5) (1988) (listing collateral requirements imposed
by section 23A).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1988). Section 23B requires that
[a] member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in any of the transactions
described in paragraph (2) only-
(A) on terms and under circumstances, including credit standards, that are
substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its subsidiary,
as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with or involving
other nonaffiliated companies, or
(B) in the absence of comparable transactions, on terms and under circum-
stances, including credit standards, that in good faith would be offered to,
or would apply to, nonaffiliated companies.
12 U.S.C. § 371c-l(a)(1) (1988).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(a)(2)-(3) (1988). The non-preferential lending require-
ments of section 23B apply to
(A) Any covered transaction with an affiliate.
(B) The sale of securities or other assets to an affiliate, including assets sub-
ject to an agreement to repurchase.
(C) The payment of money or the furnishing of services to an affiliate under
contract, lease or otherwise.
(D) Any transaction in which an affiliate acts as an agent or broker or re-
ceives a fee for its services to the bank or to any other person.
(E) Any transaction or series of transactions with a third party-
(i) if an affiliate has a financial interest in the third party, or
(ii) if an affiliate is a participant in such transaction or series of transac-
tions.
(3) Transactions that benefit affiliate
For the purpose of this subsection, any transaction by a member bank
or its subsidiary with any person shall be deemed to be a transaction with an
affiliate of such bank if any of the proceeds are used for the benefit of, or
transferred to, such affiliate.
12 U.S.C. § 371c-l(a)(2)-(3) (1988).
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pose of the lending restrictions in section 23 is to avoid the
possibility that the parent company might take advantage of
the resources of its subsidiary banks by borrowing excessively
from them, thereby putting those banks at financial risk.27
The BHCA defines a bank holding company as any com-
pany that has "control" over any bank or bank holding com-
pany.28 "Control," as used in the Act, means an ownership of
twenty-five percent or more of any class of voting securities of
a bank, the bank holding company's ability to control the elec-
tion of a majority of the directors or trustees of a company, or
a Board determination that the company directly or indirectly
exercises a controlling influence over the management or poli-
cies of the bank or company.29 The BHCA further provides
that only a "company" as defined in the Act may become a
bank holding company.30 The Act defines "company" as any
corporation, business trust, association, or similar organiza-
tion."' The Act presently excludes companies owned by fed-
27. See Miles, Banking Affiliate Regulation Under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act,
105 BANKING L.J. 476 (1988).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1988).
29. Id. As defined in the BHCA, a company which "controls" a bank does so
when
(A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other
persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any
class of voting securities of the bank or company;
(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of the
directors or trustees of the bank or company;
(C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that
the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the bank or company.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1988).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988). "Bank holding company" is defined as follows in
the BHCA: "Except as provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection, 'bank holding
company' means any company which has control over any bank or over any company
that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this chapter." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(1) (1988).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1988). The BHCA defines "company" as
[any corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or similar organi-
zation, or any other trust unless by its terms it must terminate within twenty-
five years or not later than twenty-one years and ten months after the death
of individuals living on the effective date of the trust but shall not include
any corporation the majority of the shares of which are owned by the United
States or by any State.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1988).
The original text of the Act excluded individuals, partnerships and companies
owned by religious, charitable and educational organizations from this definition.
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eral or state governments, but is silent on the status of foreign
government instrumentalities that own or control banks.3 2
First National Bank of Blue Island Employee Stock Ownership
Plan v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 33 is the only
federal case that offers an in-depth examination of the BHCA's
definition of "company." 34 In Blue Island, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an employee's stock
ownership plan (an "ESOP") that owned a bank was a "com-
pany," under the BHCA. 5 The Seventh Circuit explained that
the definition of "company" includes any formalized structure
through which individual economic interests are combined for
common business objectives.3 6 The court reasoned that ES-
Pub. L. No. 511, ch. 240, § 2(b), 70 Stat. 134 (1956). The exemption for religious,
charitable and educational organizations was eliminated by Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 2,
80 Stat. 236, 237 (1966), and that for partnerships by Pub. L. No. 91-607,
§ 101(6)(b), 84 Stat. 1762 (1970). See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 7 (1955) (limited scope of exemptions). The Senate Report stated that
[t]he exemptions previously mentioned in this report (for state/local gov-
ernments, and charitable, religious and educational entities) are the only
ones given by this bill from the definitions of company and bank holding
company. All other such organizations are required by the bill to subject
themselves to such regulation as the bill prescribes as a condition to growth
by means of bank share or asset acquisition.
Id.
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1988). Section 1841(b) makes no mention of for-
eign governments in its exception for federal and state government instrumentalities.
Id.
33. 802 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1986).
34. See id. Two other cases have, in passing, examined the BHCA's definition of
"company." See Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 890 F.2d 1274 (2d Cir. 1989); Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1976).
Borden held that a trustee in bankruptcy was not a "company" under the Act's defini-
tion, saying that
[t]he relevant legislative history fails to disclose any reason in policy or logic
for depriving the plaintiff-trustee of his status as an individual merely be-
cause he represents Corpamerica's interests. Individuals were and are ex-
cluded from the Act's operation because, unlike corporations, they have a
finite existence and, therefore, cannot exercise control over a bank in
perpetuity.
Id. at 499.
In the Independent Insurance Agents case, the court noted that "section (4)(c)(8) ...
uses the term 'company' to describe those entities [exempted from section 4's non-
banking restrictions], and 'company' is defined by section 2(b) broadly enough to
include a bank." Independent Ins. Agents, 890 F.2d at 1283.
35. Blue Island, 802 F.2d at 294.
36. Id. The court concludes that "any formalized structure through which indi-
vidual economic interests are combined for common business objectives comes
under BHCA's definition of 'company' and is to be regulated by the Board." Id.
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OPs, while not "business trusts" or "associations," are clearly
included under the "similar organizations" part of the Act's
definition of "company.""s3 The Blue Island court further em-
phasized that the broad definition of "company" used in the
Act has been expanded by the legislature's progressive elimi-
nation of the exemptions from the definition of "company" in-
cluded in the 1956 Act. 8
B. BHCA Regulation of Foreign Banks
Initially, the BHCA applied only to bank holding compa-
nies that'owned two or more banks. 39 One-bank holding com-
panies, however, began to proliferate as a means of evading
the Act's non-banking restrictions.4" Consequently, in 1970
Congress amended the Act to include these organizations
under the BHCA's jurisdiction.4' As a potential result of this
amendment, foreign bank holding companies operating a sin-
gle U.S. subsidiary bank, yet conducting the majority of their
business outside the United States, would have found their
non-U.S. activities subject to the BHCA's stringent non-bank-
ing restrictions.42
Most foreign countries do not follow the U.S. practice of
segregating banking from non-banking activities.43 Banks in
37. Id. "Congress' main concern was on long-term continuous control over
bank shares of assets .... Both [BHCA] amendments [1966 and 1970], their legisla-
tive history, and the widening scope of organizations covered demonstrate an intent
to bring all business and business-related organizations under the BHCA." Id.
38. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2391).
39. See Pub. L. No. 511, ch. 240, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (definition of "bank
holding company").
40. See S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-4, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5520-22, see also Lichtenstein, Foreign Participation in United
States Banking: Regulatory Myths and Realities, 15 B.C. COM. & INDUS. L. REV. 879, 917-
21 (1974).
41. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 2(a), 84 Stat. 1760 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(1) (1988) (definition of "bank holding company" amended to read com-
pany owning "any bank" rather than "two or more banks")); see Lichtenstein, supra
note 40, at 913-29 (description of circumstances leading to the amendment of the Act
to cover "one bank" holding companies, and its relevance to foreign banking institu-
tions).
42. See Lichtenstein, supra note 40, at 923-30.
43. See generally U. IMMENGA, STUDY: PARTICIPATION OF BANKS IN OTHER SECTORS
OF THE ECONOMY (1975) (study of banking practices in European Community coun-
tries prepared by European Commission).
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those countries are typically owned by industrial corporations
or own such companies themselves. In addition, these banks
deal in securities.44 To apply the non-banking restrictions of
the BHCA to the non-U.S. activities of foreign bank holding
companies would extend the reach of U.S. law to activities con-
ducted outside the United States under substantially different
legal rules.45 In 1970, Congress created an exemption for for-
eign bank holding companies, to avoid the potential for extra-
territorial application of the Act.46 This exemption, section
4(c)(9) of the BHCA, gives the Board authority to exempt
shareholdings or activities conducted by primarily foreign
bank holding companies with operations in the United
States. 47 Pursuant to section 4(c)(9), the Board may make ex-
emptions for individual foreign bank holding companies by or-
der or for all bank holding companies by regulation. 48 These
exemptions are at the Board's discretion, provided they are in
conformity with the purposes of the Act and in the public in-
terest.4
9
The legislative history underlying section 4(c)(9) evinces
concerns that application of the BHCA to foreign banks should
have a minimal extraterritorial effect.5 0 U.S. banking regula-
44. See generally id. (describing activities in which European banks participate).
45. See Lichtenstein, supra note 40, at 924, 929 (discussing comments of Federal
Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns and comments of Samuel R. Pierce, General Coun-
sel, Treasury Dept.).
46. § 4(c)(9), Pub. L. No. 91-607, Title 1, § 103, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1988)).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1988). Section 4(c)(9) of the BHCA gives the Board
authority to make exemptions from the non-banking restrictions of BHCA section
4(c)(8) for
shares held or activities conducted by any company organized under the
laws of a foreign country the greater part of whose business is conducted
outside the United States, if the Board by regulation or order determines
that, under the circumstances and subject to the conditions set forth in the
regulation or order, the exemption would not be substantially at variance
with the purposes of this chapter and would be in the public interest.
Id.
48. Id. A section 4(c)(9) exemption can be made for an individual foreign bank
holding company through an order, or to foreign bank holding companies generally,
by regulation. Id. An order is defined as a Board decision following an adjudicatory
hearing. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
551 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1988).
50. See One-Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970, Hearings on S. 1052, S. 1212,
S. 1664, S. 3823 and H.R. 6778, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
1989-1990]
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tors testified in hearings that the potential for extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the 1970 BHCA amendments would impose
U.S. ideas of banking upon other countries.5 ' This imposition
might invite foreign retaliation against U.S. banks operating
outside the United States.5 2
Section 4(c)(9) of the BHCA was the first significant provi-
sion of the Act to address the presence of foreign bank holding
companies *in the United States.5" The Board, in the years
since 1970, has used the section 4(c)(9) exemption very spar-
ingly when making exemptions for individual bank holding
companies. 54 It has generally used the section to make tempo-
Cong., 2d Sess. 145-46 (1970) (statement of Federal Reserve Chairman Bums) [here-
inafter Burns Comments]. Then Board Chairman Arthur Burns had the following
comments regarding the need for a non-banking exemptive provision for foreign
bank holding companies:
[w]e do not believe Congress intended the act to be applied in such a way as
to impose our ideas of banking upon other countries. To do so might invite
foreign retaliation against our banks operating abroad, to the detriment of
the foreign commerce of the United States. The provisions of the House-
passed bill authorizing the Board to grant exemptions in this area would be
most useful in dealing with these problems.
Id.; see Letter from Samuel R. Pierce, General Counsel of Treasury to Rep. William
Widnall, Chairman, House Banking Committee, reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 41,955
(Nov. 17, 1970) [hereinafter Treasury Letter]. In commenting on the difference be-
tween the House and Senate versions of H.R. 6778, the General Counsel of the
Treasury, in a letter to the Banking Committee echoed Bums' views:
Also, with respect to the exemption which would be granted for foreign
banking under both bills, we believe it to be highly desirable that there be
omitted the restrictive words "by directly or indirectly facilitating the for-
eign commerce of the United States." These words, which appear [in the
House bill] are not contained in the Senate bill. These words are unneces-
sarily restrictive as there can be other ways in which exemptions for foreign
banks can be in the public interest as, for example, avoiding the possibility
of retaliation against American branch banks abroad.
Id.
51. Treasury Letter, supra note 50.
52. See Burns Comments, supra note 50; Treasury Letter, supra note 50.
53. See Lichtenstein, supra note 40, at 917-18. Prior to BHCA section 4(c)(9) and
its concurrent amendments which applied the BHCA to one-bank holding compa-
nies, the vast majority of foreign banks in the United States were not covered by the
Act, as they did not have two subsidiaries in the United States. Id.
54. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 4 ("[t]he Board has used this exemptive
authority [BHCA § 4(c)(9)] sparingly in order to maintain maximum consistency of
treatment of domestic and foreign banking entities ...."); see also P. HELLER, FED-
ERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 5.06(1) (1988). While the authority granted to
the Board by section 4(c)(9) is broad, the Board has rarely used it liberally. Heller
notes that
[t]he inclusion of these special exemptions for foreign related acquisitions
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rary exemptions for foreign bank holding companies' non-
banking holdings in the United States owned prior to their ac-
quisition of U.S. subsidiaries, allowing the bank holding com-
panies adequate time to dispose of such holdings.55
The 1970 amendments brought only foreign bank holding
companies with U.S. subsidiaries under the BHCA's jurisdic-
tion.56 After their enactment, foreign holding company sub-
sidiaries became subject to regulations governing their non-
banking activities in the United States, promulgated by the
Board in 1971 under section 4(c)(9). 5 7  Most foreign bank
holding companies, however, did not then, and do not now,
maintain full subsidiaries in the United States.58 Between 1970
and 1978, these bank holding companies preferred branch or
agency status, thus circumventing BHCA jurisdiction.59 In the
mid- 1970s, the number of foreign bank holding companies op-
erating in the United States grew rapidly. 6° This increased for-
eign banking presence led to a congressional initiative to ad-
dress this issue, culminating in the International Banking Act
of 1978 (the "IBA"). 6' The IBA implemented a "national
[i.e., section 4(c)(9) and 4(c)(13)], without making section 4(c)(8) inapplica-
ble to such acquisitions, suggests that Congress intended to provide, or to
enable the Board to provide, a more liberal policy for such acquisitions than
is applicable to U.S. bank holding companies seeking investment in domes-
tic companies. However, the Board has expressed a concern that "foreign
banking institutions not gain competitive advantages in the United States
over domestic banking institutions" through investment in domestic corpo-
rations under Section 4(c)(9) of the BHCA. Because of these concerns, the
Board rarely has granted approval under Section 4(c)(9). Rather, the Board
is likely to treat a Section 4(c)(9) application as a temporary situation and
require the applicant to apply under Section 4(c)(8) and be subject to the
procedures and standards required for Section 4(c)(8) applications.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. P. HELLER, supra note 54, at § 5.06(1) (1988).
56. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970). Branches or agencies were
not covered by the 1970 amendments, as they were not "banks" within the BHCA's
definition, because they did not accept deposits. Id.; see 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g) (1973)
(regulations promulgated under authority of BHCA section 4(c)(9)).
57. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g) (1973).
58. See Carr & More, Developments in the Regulation of Foreign Bank Operations in the
United States, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 225, 228-30.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 225-26. In 1980 there were 350 U.S. operations of foreign banks;
in 1987 there were 658 such operations. Id. at 226.
61. The International Banking Act, Pub. L. No. No 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978),
as amended by Competitive Equality in Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 204,
101 Stat. 552 (1987); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L.
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treatment" approach to regulating U.S. activities of foreign
banks. Under the IBA, foreign banks were permitted opportu-
nities equivalent to those of similarly situated domestic
banks. 6
The IBA extended BHCA jurisdiction to foreign bank
holding companies' branches and agencies in the United
States, allowing each bank one "home state" where they can
establish a presence. 6 The IBA also allowed the continuation
No. 97-320, §§ 704, 705, 96 Stat. 1539 (1982); Act of Sept. 4, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
64, 93 Star. 412 (1979) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-08 (1988) and in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IBA].
62. See P. HELLER, supra note 54, at § 5.06(2). In characterizing the goal of the
IBA, Heller stated that
[t]he International Banking Act of 1978 ("IBA") was designed to strive for
competitive equality between domestic and foreign banks, to preserve and
enhance the ability of States to attract foreign capital and develop interna-
tional banking centers, and to provide some leverage to secure more equita-
ble treatment for United States banks abroad.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Wallich, The Case for National Treatment of Foreign Banks,
IssuEs IN BANK REGULATION 59 (Summer 1984). Henry Wallich, former Federal Re-
serve Board Chairman, described "national treatment" as
the guiding principle for the regulation of foreign banks in the United
States. It provides a nondiscriminatory regulatory environment in which
domestic banks and the domestic affiliates of foreign banks can compete on
equal terms, with departures from precise regulatory parallelism that allow
for special features of the two types of institutions .... (It] is derived from
the longstanding policy of openness to foreign enterprise which the United
States has always followed. It is the basic principle that underlies the Inter-
national Banking Act.
Id.
63. See 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a)(1) (1988). The IBA extended the jurisdiction of the
BHCA to cover branch and agency presences of foreign banks in the United States.
Id. The IBA provides that
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section (1) any foreign bank that
maintains a branch or agency in a State, (2) any foreign bank or foreign
company controlling a foreign bank that controls a commercial lending
company organized under State law, and (3) any company of which any for-
eign bank or company referred to in (1) and (2) is a subsidiary shall be sub-
ject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
12 U.S.C. § 3106(a)(1) (1988). Interstate branching is addressed by 12 U.S.C.
§ 3103(a), which provides that
no foreign bank may directly or indirectly establish and operate a Federal
branch outside its home State unless (A) its operation is expressly permitted
by the State in which it is to be operated, and (B) the foreign banks shall
enter into an agreement or undertaking with the Board to receive only such
deposits at the place of operation of such Federal branch as would be per-
missible for a corporation organized under section 25(a) of the Federal Re-
serve Act.
12 U.S.C. § 3013 (1988).
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of specific non-banking activities of certain bank holding com-
pany activities that had been established in the United States
prior to the date of the IBA's enactment.' Foreign banks es-
tablished in the United States after that time could not engage
in these activities.65
The IBA also amended the BHCA to add section 2(h)(2),
an exemption for non-banking activities of foreign bank hold-
ing companies principally engaged in banking activities outside
the United States.66 This amendment statutorily incorporated
the Board's 1971 regulations under section 4(c)(9). 6 7 It ex-
empts foreign banks' non-banking shareholdings from the
BHCA's non-banking prohibitions when the shares are held by
a bank holding company principally engaged in the banking
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 3106(c)(1)-(2) (1988) (engagement of foreign banks in pre-
existing non-banking activities in the United States).
65. Id.
66. See Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(e), 92 Stat. 623 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(h)(2) (1988)).
67. See International Banking Act of 1977, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance, of the Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs on H.R. 7325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., July 12, 13, and 19, 1977 at 110-11
(statement of Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter 1977 HOUSE REPORT]. The Board,
in a prepared statement, asked for statutory ratification of its regulatory approach
under section 4(c)(9), stating that
[w]hile the Board believes that it has sufficient regulatory authority under
section 4(c)(9) to deal with problems that may occur in this area [i.e., non-
banking restrictions], we also believe that it would be desirable at this time
for the Congress to adopt a more well-defined legislative policy. A great
number of foreign banks emanating from a great variety of banking environ-
ments would become subject to the nonbanking prohibitions of the Bank
Holding Company Act as a result of this proposed legislation. The lack of a
statutory policy could initially cause some misunderstanding by foreign
banks of the Act's effects on foreign companies with U.S. operations and
would make more difficult the task of formulating appropriate general regu-
lations.
Therefore, the Board recommends that H.R. 13876 be amended to
make clear that the nonbanking prohibitions of the Bank Holding Company
Act are not meant to prevent foreign banks principally engaged in banking
abroad from retaining or acquiring interests in foreign-chartered nonbank-
ing companies that are also principally engaged in business outside the
United States. We do feel however, that as a corollary to any such amend-
ment, a domestic office of a foreign bank should be required to deal with the
domestic operations of a foreign company in which it may have an equity
interest on a strictly arms-length basis so as not to give the firm or bank
involved an advantage over their respective U.S. competitors.
Id. at 110-11.
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business outside the United States.68 This differs from section
4(c)(9) of the BHCA in two important ways. Initially, section
2(h)(2)'s exemption is not dependent on the Board's discre-
tion. Moreover, section 2(h)(2) applies only to foreign compa-
nies principally engaged in the banking business outside the
United States.69 In contrast, the section 4(c)(9) exemption
does not require the bank holding company to be principally
engaged in banking outside the United States to obtain a dis-
cretionary exemption for its non-banking activities. 7°
By the close of the 1970s, the Board subjected all foreign
bank holding companies active in the United States to BHCA
jurisdiction, except those owned by foreign government in-
strumentalities. 7' The Board had followed this practice con-
sistently in the period from 1970, when the BHCA became ap-
plicable to foreign banks owning U.S. subsidiaries, until 1988,
when the Banca Commerciale Italiana attempted to acquire the
Irving Bank Company.72
68. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h)(2) (1988). Section 2(h)(2) provides an exemption
from BHCA for
shares of any company organized under the laws of a foreign country (or to
shares held by such company in any company engaged in the same general
line of business as the investor company or in a business related to the busi-
ness of the investor company) that is principally engaged in business outside
the United States if such shares are held or acquired by a bank holding com-
pany organized under the laws of a foreign country that is principally en-
gaged in the banking business outside the United States.
Id.
69. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1988), with 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h)(2)(1988)
(illustrating difference between two provisions in overall proportion of banking activ-
ity required of holding company to be eligible for exemptions).
70. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1988) (no requirement in BHCA section 4(c)(9)
that foreign bank holding company be primarily involved in banking business).
71. See Gruson & Weld, Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Banks Operating in the United
States, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 129, 130. All possible forms of foreign banking presence in
the United States were subject to the BHCA's jurisdiction when branches and agen-
cies were included under the Act. Id. The only exemption was that made by the
Board for foreign and non-state and federal government owned banking instrumen-
talities. See infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text (discussing history of exemp-
tion of foreign and non-state and federal government owned holding companies).
72. See infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text.
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II. FEDERAL RESERVE PRACTICE IN REGULA TING
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT BANK HOLDING
INSTRUMENTALITIES
A. 1970 to 1988. Non-Application of the BHCA
In foreign countries, banks are often directly or indirectly
owned by the government.73 This ownership can take place in
several ways. These government controlled banks can be a
part of the government, such as a central bank.7 ' Another
form of government ownership is the holding of shares in a
bank held either directly by the government, or indirectly by a
government-owned holding instrumentality. 75 Prior to 1988,
the Board avoided application of the BHCA to foreign govern-
ment instrumentalities that owned banks, or operated
branches or agencies in the United States. The Board avoided
such application because governments did not fit within the
BHCA's definition of "company" and because the Act is silent
on the status of foreign government instrumentalities as "com-
panies."76 Furthermore, the Board determined that the for-
eign policy issues raised by application of the BHCA to foreign
government instrumentalities militated against applying the
Act in this situation.77 The Board enumerated these reasons in
interpretive letters that it issued in response to inquiries from
foreign government instrumentalities wishing to acquire U.S.
banks and in a 1983 Federal Reserve staff memorandum (the
"1983 Staff Memorandum") addressing foreign government
ownership. 8
The concern for regulatory comity7 9 between states was
73. See S. HOLLAND, supra note 3, at 245-65.
74. See State Bank of India, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 430 (1982) (considering bank
owned directly by Indian government bank).
75. See Banca Commerciale Italiana, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 423 (1982) (considering
bank owned in part by Italian government holding instrumentality).
76. See infra notes 91-108 (Board's statutory interpretation of BHCA's definition
of "company" held not to include foreign government instrumentalities).
77. See 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 2.
78. See 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4 (prepared at Congress' request);
Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board to Doug Bar-
nard, Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of
the House Committee on Government Operations, at 1 (Oct. 28, 1983) (copy on file
at Fordham International Law Journal office) [hereinafter Volcker Letter].
79. The legal concept of comity was described by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). The Supreme Court stated that comity
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evidently a strong factor favoring non-application of the Act to
foreign government instrumentalities.80 Application of the Act
to foreign government instrumentalities would raise not only
U.S. banking policy issues, but also issues of U.S. foreign rela-
tions and foreign economic policy.8 ' Specifically, application
of the BHCA to these instrumentalities and their banking
presences in the United States would bring customary govern-
ment activities, not just commercial activities, within the scope
of the Act.82 In addition to these foreign policy implications,
the application of the BHCA to foreign government instru-
mentalities and their U.S. banking presences also presents an
issue of statutory construction."
Although the Act specifies that domestic federal and state
government-owned instrumentalities that own banks are not
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere cour-
tesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one na-
tion allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation,' having due regard both to international duty and conven-
ience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.
Id. Another court has described the concept as
[a] necessary outgrowth of our international system of politically independ-
ent, socio-economically interdependent nation states. As surely as people,
products and problems move freely among adjoining countries, so national
interests cross territorial borders. But no nation can expect its laws to reach
further than its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Every na-
tion must often rely on other countries to help it achieve its regulatory ex-
pectations. Thus, comity compels national courts to act at all times to in-
crease the international legal ties that advance the rule of law within and
among nations.
Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
80. See 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 9.
81. See Volcker Letter, supra note 78, at 1. Volcker characterized the basic issue
in regulating foreign government banking instrumentalities in stating that
[t]he basic question is whether foreign governmental entities may engage in
broader banking and nonbanking activities here than private U.S. or foreign
companies with a banking presence in the United States. This question is
one that involves not only U.S. banking policy but broader U.S. policy inter-
ests including foreign investment policy and more generally, U.S. foreign
relations and foreign economic policy.
Id.; see 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 9. The Staff Memorandum noted
that "[a]s a nonqualifying organization, the foreign government would be automati-
cally subject to all the rules governing nonbank activities of domestic bank holding
companies, thus bringing within the scope of the Act not only the conduct of com-
mercial activities here and abroad but also customary government functions." Id.
82. 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 9.
83. See P. HELLER, supra note 54, § 1.01 n.13.1, § 5.06(1) n.2.
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"companies" and, thus, are not subject to BHCA jurisdiction,
the Act is silent on the issue of whether foreign government
instrumentalities are to be given .a similar exemption. 4 Until
1988, the Board maintained that foreign as well as non-state or
federal governmental instrumentalities with banking activities
in the United States should be so exempted. Two interpretive
letters issued by the Board clarify its reasons for this policy.
In 1978, Bank Hapoalim considered acquiring a U.S.
bank.8 5 Before undertaking the acquisition, the bank sought a
Board ruling as to whether its parent organization, the Israeli
labor organization Histadrut or its affiliated company Hevrat
Ovdim, was a "company" under the BHCA.8 6 Histadrut and
Hevrat Ovdim owned interests in non-banking subsidiaries.8 7
The Board reasoned that foreign government instrumentalities
owning U.S. banks, like those of domestic government instru-
mentalities, were something other than partnerships, business
trusts, associations, or similar organizations."8 Consequently,
the Board held that a foreign government instrumentality own-
ing a bank was not a "company" under the Act, and thus the
Act would not apply.8 9 The Board stated that neither His-
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b)(1988). The 1956 Act's legislative history explains this
definitional exemption by acknowledging that such organizations are already subject
to the control of either the United States or of the state owning such shares, and need
no further regulation. The 1955 Senate Report stated: "The first exclusion is pro-
vided on the theory that any corporation the majority of whose shares are owned by
the United States or any State is subject to the control of either the United States or
of the State owning such shares." 1955 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6-7; see 12
U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1988) (no mention of an exception for foreign governments).
85. See Letter from Theodore E. Allison, Secretary of the Federal Reserve
Board, to Rita E. Hauser, Esq. (June 27, 1978) (copy on file at Fordham International
Law Journal office) [hereinafter Histadrut Letter].
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id. Histadrut's profits were not distributed to its members, but were re-in-
vested in new or existing enterprises. Id. Hevrat Ovdim also owned several trading
companies active in the United States. Id.
88. Id. at 2. The Board, in the Histadrut Letter, acknowledged that
[b]y specifically exempting from the definition corporations majority owned
by the government of the United States or of the States, Congress implied
that the governments themselves were not "companies" for purposes of the
Act ....
[A] foreign government, just as the government of the United States
and of the States [is] something other than a "corporation, partnership,
business trust, association or similar organization."
Id.
89. Id. at 1-2.
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tadrut nor its affiliate Hevrat Ovdim, were part of the govern-
ment of Israel, they were government-like institutions and
were therefore not companies under the BHCA. 90 The Board
concluded that Bank Hapoalim could acquire a U.S. bank with-
out a Board application under the BHCA, because neither His-
tadrut nor Hevrat Ovdim were companies under the Act.9"
Similarly, in an interpretive letter concerning the Ameri-
can Indian National Bank ("AINB"), the Board ruled that
AINB, a bank holding company owned by several American In-
dian tribes, was not a "company" under the BHCA's defini-
tion.92 The Board found that the tribes owning AINB per-
formed governmental functions, promulgated and executed
civil and criminal laws, chartered corporations, and levied
taxes. 93 These attributes resembled the state and federal gov-
ernments more closely than the corporations, business trusts,
and similar organizations enumerated in the BHCA's defini-
tion of "company."' Furthermore, the Board found that the
tribes' financial activities were incidental to its governmental
activities and were intended for the benefit of all tribal mem-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2. The Histadrut Letter did not require Histadrut to file an application
under the BHCA. Id. The Board stated that "[a]ccordingly, in the event Bank ap-
plies to form a bank holding company and the Board acts favorably on such applica-
tion, the Board would not require similar applications from Histadrut or Hevrat
Ovdim despite the fact that those organizations directly or indirectly control Bank."
Id. The Board did, however, reserve the right to ensure that the U.S. operations of
the Bank would be conducted independently of Histadrut and Hevrat Ovdim. Id. at
2-3.
92. Letter from Robert E. Mannion, Associate General Counsel, Federal Re-
serve Board to David Martin, Esq. (June 9, 1978) (copy on file at Fordham International
Law Journal office) [hereinafter AINB letter].
93. Id. at 2. The Board found that the tribes performed functions equivalent to
that of a sovereign government. "Specifically, the Tribes have jurisdiction to pro-
mulgate civil and criminal laws, to execute those laws and to maintain a judicial sys-
tem, to charter corporations and to levy taxes and that such jurisdiction is, in fact,
exercised by both tribes with respect to their members." Id.
94. Id. at 2. The Board concluded that government entities other than those of
federal and state governments were to be treated in accordance with those of domes-
tic governments. The Board stated
[a]s indicated above, it is apparent that Congress in section 2(b) did not
consider the United States and the States to be either corporations, business
trusts, associations or similar organizations. Because of their functions and
purposes, the Tribes .. . should not be regarded as "companies" as that
term is defined in section 2(b) and, thus, would not be bank holding compa-
nies.
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bers. 95 The policy of the Board, therefore, was to treat foreign
and domestic sovereign instrumentalities as federal or state
governments and to exempt them from application of the
BHCA.9 6
The Board, however, had suggested a potential change in
position in a 1982 order (the "1982 BCI Order").97 In the
1982 BCI Order, the Board approved the acquisition by an
Italian bank, Banca Commerciale Italiana ("BCI"), of a New
York medium-sized consumer bank, Long Island Trust Co.
("LITCO").98 The Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale
("IRI"), a large holding instrumentality owned by the Italian
government and involved in diverse non-banking activities,
owned BCI.9 9 Although the Board did not find that IRI was a
"company" subject to BHCA jurisdiction,' 0 0 it concluded in
an internal legal memorandum (the "1982 Memo"), that it had
BHCA jurisdiction over foreign government instrumentalities
when they or their subsidiaries operated banks in the United
States. 0 1 The Board's 1982 BCI Order maintained that apply-
95. Id. The Board acknowledged that the motivations underlying the Tribe's
ownership of a bank holding company were different from those of private entrepre-
neurs. Id. "Further, it appears that the Tribes' financial activities, such as their in-
vestments in AINB, are incidental to the Tribes' governmental activities and are in-
tended ultimately to promote the well-being of all tribal members." Id.
96. See Post-och Kreditbanken, PKbanken, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 787 (1982); State Bank
of India, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 430 (1982); Banca Commerciale Italiana, 68 Fed. Res. Bull.
423 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 BCI Order]; Societe Generale, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 453
(1981); Banco Exterior de Espana, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 504 (1980); Korea Exchange Bank, 39
Fed. Reg. 20,423 (1972).
97. 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96.
98. Id. at 424-25.
99. See generally S. HOLLAND, supra note 3 (extensive discussion of IRI's history
and methodology); Pontarollo, Italy: Effects of Substituting Political Objectives for Business
Goals in STATE INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 25-58 (B. Hindley, ed.
1983) (describing of IRI's history and activities).
100. See 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 425.
101. See Legal Memorandum: Status of Foreign Governments and Foreign Gov-
ernment-Owned Corporations under the Bank Holding Company Act (Feb. 7, 1983)
[hereinafter the 1983 Memo], reprinted in Foreign Government and Foreign Investor Control
of United States Banks, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 505-10 (1983) [hereinafter 1983
House Report]. At the time of the 1982 BCI Order, the Board had prepared an
internal memorandum which concluded that the Board had BHCA jurisdiction over
foreign government bank holding companies. The internal memorandum empha-
sized that the BHCA explicitly exempts state and federal government instrumentali-
ties, but is silent on foreign government-owned instrumentalities. Id. at 505-06. By
negative inference, the Act probably applies to such entities. Id. at 506. However,
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ing the BHCA to foreign government instrumentalities without
prior notice would be inappropriate. The Board, however, left
open the possibility of a future policy change in that order.1
0 2
In the 1982 BCI Order, the Board justified its non-appli-
cation of the BHCA by noting that any excessive financial in-
terrelationships between LITCO and IRI's non-banking com-
panies would be controlled by applying section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act, which limits interaffiliate lending. 0 3 The
Board required that all Italian government-owned businesses
(including non-IRI companies) would be "affiliates" of LITCO
for the purposes of applying section 23A.104 This expansive
application of section 23A allayed Board concerns about the
potential effects of not including BCI and LITCO under the
BHCA's jurisdiction. 105
In the 1982 BCI Order, the Board requested legislative
attention to the policy questions raised by foreign govern-
ment-affiliated banks acquiring U.S. banks. 0 6 Congress held
hearings on the issue of foreign government instrumentalities'
ownership of U.S. banks in 1982 and 1983, but these hearings
did not result in amendment of the BHCA to address the status
the same considerations that allow for exemption of U.S. governmental entities may
also apply to foreign governments. Id. The BHCA's legislative history sheds little
light on this issue. Id. Congress may not have intended that BHCA regulation
should interfere with sovereign or governmental functions. d.
The memorandum also emphasized that the term "person" as used in antitrust
statutes has been construed as including foreign governments within its scope, al-
lowing such governments standing to sue under these statutes. Id. at 507. The mem-
orandum also noted that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA") allows
suit against foreign governments when they act in a commercial capacity. Id. at 507-
08. By analogy, a foreign government need not be excluded from BHCA regulation
solely because of its sovereign status. Id. The purpose of the BHCA-maintaining
the separation of banking and commerce and avoiding interstate banking-suggests
that the Act should apply to foreign governments, even if they are not specifically
mentioned in the Act. Id. at 508. Finally the internal memorandum expressed the
view that the IBA's guiding principle of "national treatment," might be violated if
foreign governments were allowed a greater degree of non-banking activity or inter-
state branching than domestic or foreign privately owned bank holding companies.
Id. at 509-10.
102. 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 425.
103. Id. at 424.
104. Memorandum in Support of the Applications of Banca Commerciale Ital-
iana Pursuant to Sections 3(a)(3) and 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, as amended, to Acquire Control of Irving Bank Corporation, at 8-9 (copy on
file at Fordham International Law Journal office) [hereinafter BCI Memo].
105. See 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 425.
106. Id.
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of these instrumentalities under the Act. 10 7  As late as 1986,
the Board still exempted foreign government instrumentalities
from BHCA regulation. It applied the Act only to the appli-
cant banking instrumentality, and not to all other instrumen-
talities of the foreign government that owned the banking in-
strumentality.108
B. A Change in the Board's Approach: The Foreign Government
Instrumentality as a "Company" under the BHCA
In the 1982 BCI Order, the Board identified acquisitions
by foreign government instrumentalities of additional U.S.
banks as a reason for a future policy change. 10 9 An opportu-
nity occurred in 1988, when BCI made a takeover offer chal-
lenging the Bank of New York's ("BNY") hostile attempt to
acquire the Irving Bank Company, a large, internationally ac-
tive, New York commercial bank.' l° BNY mounted a con-
certed advertising campaign to arouse public sentiment against
the acquisition of a large U.S. bank by a foreign government
instrumentality."' BNY also pressured the Board to issue a
ruling requiring BCI's government-owned bank holding com-
pany, IRI, to file an application under the BHCA. 1 2 BNY
107. See 1983 House Report, supra note 101. These hearings did not progress
beyond the preliminary stage.
108. See Compagnie Financiere de Suez, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 141 (1986). This order
applied the BHCA to the banking corporation (Compagnie Financiere de Suez) own-
ing the U.S. entity (Indosuez Options) but not to the other commercial enterprises
owned by the French government which owned Compagnie Financiere. Id. at 142.
109. 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 425.
110. See Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
by Banca Commerciale Italiana for prior approval of the acquisition of Irving Bank
Corporation, at 7-9 (May 19, 1988) (copy on file at Fordham International Law Journal
office) (describing BNY's takeover attempt) [hereinafter BCI Application]; see also
Cowan, Irving Takes Improved Bid by Italian Bank, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1988 at DI, col. 3;
Cowan, Irving Board Weighing Latest Takeover Offer, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1988, at D2,
col. 5.
111. See Duffy, BCI Angry Over Bank of New York Tactics, American Banker, June
17, 1988, at 1; Duffy & Kraus, Bank of New York Ads Termed Xenophobic, American
Banker, May 9, 1988, at 2. Mauro Galli of Banco di Roma's New York office was
quoted as saying: "Bank of New York has started a campaign that is very close to
slander .... I don't question the economic argument put forward by Bank of New
York. But the press campaign is offensive, unprofessional, and inaccurate." Id. BCI
said in a press release that "[w]e truly regret the appearance of the Bank of New
York's most recent advertisement. The advertisement, in our view, is very nearly
xenophobic and borders on the offensive." Id.
112. See Fraust, Bank of New York Intensoies Attack on Irving Bid. Hostile Suitor Pushes
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wanted this ruling to be issued quickly so as not to impede its
takeover plans."t3 The Board responded to this situation in an
interpretive letter (the "1988 BCI Letter")." t 4 The 1988 BCI
Letter clearly articulated a change in policy, holding that IRI
was a "company" under the BHCA and, thus, subject to Board
jurisdiction. ' 15
In contrast to BCI's earlier acquisition of LITCO, its ac-
quisition of Irving would have resulted in indirect foreign gov-
ernment control of an internationally active, major U.S. com-
mercial bank." 6 The Board, in addressing this situation, an-
nounced a general policy change. Henceforth, all foreign
government instrumentalities with banking branches and agen-
cies in the United States would be subject to the BHCA." 7
for Separate Application from Banca Commerciale's Parent, American Banker, June 9, 1988,
at 3 [hereinafter Fraust, BNY Intensifies Attack]. Fraust described the Bank of New
York's tactical reasons for pressing the Board for a regulatory stance favoring their
position noting that
[I]awyers for the Bank of New York... pressed federal and state regulators
for rulings that they hope will deter Banca Commerciale Italiana from pur-
suing its bid to buy a 51% interest in Irving Bank Corp.
In letters to the Federal Reserve Board and the New York State Banking
Department, Bank of New York requested expedited rulings on several legal
issues. If the regulators back Bank of New York's position on one key issue,
Banca Commerciale's parent would be required to file its own applications
to acquire Irving, in addition to those filed by the Milan-based bank.
Id. See Fraust, NY Fed Queries Banca Commerciale On Dealings with Italian Conglomerate,
American Banker, June 7, 1988, at 2; Matthews, Italian Bid for Irving May Face Fed
Scrutiny, American Banker, Apr. 20, 1988, at 8.
113. See Fraust, BNY Intensifies Attack, supra note 112.
114. 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7.
115. See id. at 3-4.
116. Id. at 3.
117. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7. So as to maintain equality of treatment
between foreign government-owned entities, the Board applied the BHCA to all such
entities, but exempted their non-banking activities under section 4(c)(9) stating that
[t]he Board recognizes that, under the International Banking Act, its deci-
sion in this matter would subject IRI as well as a number of other foreign
government-controlled companies of a similar character to the provisions of
the BHC Act due to their ownership of foreign banks with branches and
agencies in the United States. None of these companies now owns a subsidi-
ary bank in the United States .... [Tihe Board has decided to exempt under
section 4(c)(9) the existing and prospective nonbanking activities of these
foreign government-controlled companies insofar as they have indirect
banking operations in the United States through branches or agencies. This
exemption would continue for so long as these companies continue to meet
the requirement in section 4(c)(9) that a majority of their business is con-
ducted outside the United States and they do not acquire control of a U.S.
bank. In addition, these companies would also be exempt from filing re-
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The Board stated that the wide scope of the BHCA's "com-
pany" definition and its duty to interpret the Act "as written"
mandated a finding that IRI and all foreign government instru-
mentalities operating U.S. banks were "companies" under the
Act."" The Board emphasized that its 1982 BCI Order had
ports with the Board under its various regulations, except insofar as the
Board may specifically require, and from compliance with capital require-
ments applicable to bank holding companies.
Id. at 7-8.
118. See id. at 3. The Board based its decision on the broad scope of the
BHCA's definition of "company." In its 1988 BCI Letter, the Board stated that
[ifn this regard, the Board has considered first the definition of "company"
in section 2(b) of the [Bank Holding Company] Act .... By its terms, this
definition exempts only trusts of limited duration and majority-owned cor-
poration of Federal or State governments. The definition does not exempt
foreign government controlled corporations or similar entities.
Id. at 3-4; see Memorandum in Further Support of the Applications of Banca Com-
merciale Italiana Pursuant to Sections 3(a)(3) and 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956, as amended, to Acquire Control of Irving Bank Corporation (copy
on file at Fordham International Law Journal office) [hereinafter BCI Memo II]. BCI
emphasized that the Board's Histadrut and AINB letters had found that foreign gov-
ernment bank holding companies were not "companies" under the BHCA, and main-
tained that the exemption of U.S. government instrumentalities from that definition
extended to foreign governments. Id. at 15, 17. BCI attributed the limitation to U.S.
government instrumentalities to the lack of foreign banking presence in the United
States in 1956. Id. at 14. Thus, it was more a legislative oversight than a conscious
omission. Id. at 15. BCI emphasized that the BHCA defines "company" as "corpora-
tions, business trusts ... and similar associations," but these terms themselves are
not defined in the Act. Id. at 11-12. A "corporation" is usually understood as two or
more persons associated pursuant to statute, in a common business enterprise. Gov-
ernments do not fit this description, nor are they "similar organizations." Id. at 11.
They cannot, therefore, be "companies" under the BHCA. Id. at 12-13. BCI empha-
sized that IRI was instead an Italian governmental instrumentality implementing eco-
nomic development objectives. Id. at 24-27.
BCI emphasized that IRI is only structurally similar to a private holding com-
pany. BCI Memo II, supra, at 27 (citing Legal Opinion of Studio Avv. Ercole
Graziadei, 30 June, 1988 (copy on file at Fordham International Law Journal office)
[hereinafter Graziadei Opinion]). Under Italian law, it is called "an autonomous
management entity operating according to criteria of economic efficiency."
Graziadei Opinion, at 2 (citing art. 3 of law No. 1589 of Dec. 22, 1956). Unlike a
conventional company, IRI does not issue stock, and the Italian government's inter-
est in it is not that of a shareholder. BCI Memo II, supra, at 8. IRI's profits are part of
the State Treasury. Id. at 7-8. The government finances IRI from public funds, and
receives IRI's profits. Id. The government supervises the instrumentality through its
Ministry of State Holdings, the Interministerial Economic Planning Committee, the
Interministerial Committee for Industrial Planning, and appoints the members of
IRI's Board of Directors. Id. at 6-7. It is not autonomous from the government,
whose permission it must obtain before acquiring or disposing of its subsidiaries'
shareholdings. Graziadei Opinion, supra, at 3. IRI has been characterized as a "trans-
mission belt" that converts governmental directives into management acts by exercis-
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foreshadowed the likelihood for a policy change on this is-
sue." 9 IRI would therefore have to make an application under
the BHCA.12 0 If the merger were approved, IRI would be sub-
ject to the Act, with certain exemptions from the BHCA's
prohibitions on non-banking activities and reporting require-
ments made by the Board pursuant to section 4(c)(9) of the
Act. 12 ' This exemption would be granted for a three-year pe-
riod, at the end of which IRI's status would be reviewed. 122
ing its voting rights at its affiliate's shareholder meetings. Id. at 4-5. Though resem-
bling a "holding company," IRI exists substantially to implement government eco-
nomic policy. Id. at 4.
In contrast to IRI itself, its affiliates (including BCI) operate independently of
the government, and are organized as private joint-stock corporations. BCI Memo
II, supra, at 35. IRI's influence in their management is limited to exercise of its share-
holder voting rights. The majority of BCI's directors are non-IRI affiliated, and a
substantial percentage of BCI is privately held. Id. at 23, 35-36. IRI, then, is analo-
gous to those U.S. governmental organizations known as "public authorities."
Graziadei Opinion, supra, at 2. Conversely, BCI is equivalent to a private corpora-
tion. BCI Memo II, supra, at 35-36. For these reasons, BCI concluded that IRI was
an instrumentality of the Italian government, not a "company" subject to the BHCA.
See BCI Memo II, supra; see also Comments of the Bank of New York Company, Inc. on
the Application of Banca Commerciale Italiana S.p.A. to Acquire Control of Irving
Bank Corporation, June 24, 1988 (copy on file at Fordham International Law Journal
office) [hereinafter BNY Memo]. BNY characterized IRI as functionally equivalent to
a private holding company. Id. IRI's creditors could only look to IRI's assets and not
to the Italian government for satisfaction of IRI's debts. Id. at 7. IRI's contractual
undertakings are not governed by the special rules for government agencies, but by
the civil law, as are private corporations. Id. It also emphasized that IRI is described
as a "financial public corporation" in Italian law. Id. (emphasis in original).
BNY's most emphatic distinction between IRI and a typical government instru-
mentality is IRI's lack of regulatory power. BNY Memo, supra, at 8. BNY cited Italian
case law holding that financial public corporations like IRI are subject to the eco-
nomic rules that govern markets, and are governed by the same law applicable to
private parties. Id. at 8-9. Such status is incompatible with the possession of regula-
tory powers. Id. at 9. For these reasons, BNY asserted that IRI was equivalent to a
private holding company and should be regulated as such. Id. at 8-12.
The Board's 1988 BCI Letter strongly reflects the legal argument advanced by
the Bank of New York. Compare 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 3-4 with BNY
Memo, supra, at 12-19 (similarity of arguments advanced by the Board and by BNY's
attorneys as to applicability of BHCA to foreign government instrumentalities). The
Bank of New York's attorneys had emphasized the decisive importance of the
BHCA's "company" definition, its broad reach, and its application to IRI. Id. at 12-
19. The Board in the 1988 BCI Letter implicitly accepted the Bank of New York's
assertion that foreign governments were covered by Blue Island's view of the BHCA's
"company" definition. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 3-4.
119. 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 2.
120. See id. at 4.
121. 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7.
122. Id. at 7.
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The Board stated that its exemption of IRI's non-banking
activities would avoid any excessively extraterritorial effects of
the BHCA's non-banking restrictions, which it recognized as
an important issue in regulating the U.S. banking activities of
foreign government instrumentalities. 23  It also stated that
this exemption would permit the Italian government to oper-
ate within the scope of the laws of Italy while achieving the
objectives of U.S. banking regulations. 24  This exemption,
however, would have imposed a rigid managerial and financial
separation between IRI, BCI, and Irving, including an absolute
prohibition of intra-company lending.2 5
This prohibition against intra-company lending was far
more restrictive than the 1982 BCI Order's use of section
23A's inter-affiliate lending restrictions would have led BCI to
expect. 2 6 The prohibition of lending between Irving and any
123. Id. at 4-5.
124. Id. at 5.
125. Id. at 5-6. The 1988 BCI Letter imposed several stringent limitations on
most managerial and financial interrelationships. It stated that
[t]he [4(c)(9)] exemption would be conditioned upon compliance by IRI
with the following limitations [no loans to affiliates, no interlocking manage-
ment relationships, or cross marketing of services not permitted to U.S.
banks, maintenance of Irving's lead bank status in the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem and maintenance of capital adequacy requirements] designed to mini-
mize the potential for conflicts of interest, concentration of resources, un-
sound banking practices and other adverse effects that section 4 of the Act is
designed to prevent.
Id.
126. See 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 424. The 1982 BCI Order noted that
the financial interrelationships between IRI and LITCO would be controlled by ap-
plication of section 23A. The 1982 BCI Order stated that
[BCI] through common government ownership, is affiliated with a number
of banking and nonbanking organizations, some of which operate locally in
Italy and others internationally. Upon acquisition of LITCO by BCI, Bank
will become affiliated with these organizations. Section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act [12 U.S.C. § 371 c] applies to extensions of credit to and invest-
ments in affiliates by member banks. Generally, section 23A sets limits on
the amounts that may be loaned by a member bank to affiliates and sets
strict collateral requirements for any loans to an affiliate. Thus, Bank's ex-
tensions of credit to any majority-owned subsidiaries of the Italian govern-
ment, including IRI and its majority-owned subsidiaries, will be subject to
the requirements of section 23A.
Id.; see 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 5. The 1988 BCI Letter carried this approach
to the extreme of prohibiting such lending. Id.; see BCI Memo, supra note 104. BCI
maintained that IRI's corporate affiliates, including BCI, would be affiliates of Irving
as well, under subsection (C)(1) of section 23A, because IRI's affiliates were compa-
nies that are controlled directly or indirectly by a shareholder (IRI) which controls
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Italian government instrumentality 2 7 suggests that the Board
viewed all Italian government enterprises as bank holding
company affiliates for the purposes of applying section 23A. t12
The non-banking activities of foreign banks and bank holding
companies, often a significant component of their activities,
were a strong concern of the Board in the past.12 9 Those activ-
ities motivated this prohibition. 30 A 1984 interpretive letter,
for example, noted that section 23A's exemption for transac-
tions between fellow banks in a bank holding company would
not generally be available to foreign banks.' 3 ' The Board
the member bank (BCI/Irving). Id. at 9-11. BCI maintained that IRI itself or the
Italian government would not be affiliates of Irving, because they were not "compa-
nies." Id. at 11. The definition of "company" in section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act, is nearly identical to the BHCA's, comprises corporations, partnerships, busi-
ness trusts, associations, and similar organizations, but has no governmental exemp-
tion. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(B)(6) (1988). Because of this similarity, BCI took the position
that the definition of "company" in section 23A would not include Italian govern-
ment subsidiaries other than the IRI group. BCI Memo, supra note 3, at 7-12.
127. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7. The Board imposed the following re-
strictions on intra-company lending:
Irving and its subsidiaries could not, directly or indirectly, extend credit in
any manner to or for the benefit of, purchase securities issued by or
purchase assets from, sell assets to, issue a guarantee, acceptance, accom-
modation endorsement, letter of credit, or standby letter of credit for the
benefit of, or confirm a letter of credit on behalf of, IRI or the Republic of
Italy or any company or entity owned or controlled by IRI or the Republic
of Italy. This limitation would not be applicable in the case of transactions
entered into by Irving and IRI's subsidiary banks in the normal course of
correspondent relationships involving deposits and payments.
Id. at 5.
128. See BCI Memo, supra note 104, at 8-9. With BCI's consent, the Board, in its
1982 BCI Order, decided that the application of section 23A to BCI would apply to
transactions between BCI's U.S. affiliate (LITCO) and any instrumentality of the Ital-
ian government. Id. Effectively, this equates the entirety of the Italian government
with a holding company, in that managerial unity and influence is implied on a gov-
ernment-wide basis. Id.
129. 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5-9.
130. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 5.
131. See Letter from William W. Wiles, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to
Barry Swart (Mar. 19, 1984) (copy on file at Fordham International Law Journal office)
[hereinafter Barclay's Letter]. In the Barclay's Letter, the Board noted that Federal
Reserve Act § 23A's exemption of transactions by "sister banks" in a holding com-
pany did not generally apply to foreign banks, because foreign banks' U.S. branches
were not included under section 23A's definition of "bank." Id. In the Barclay's
Letter, the Board further stated that
[i]n creating these statutory exemptions for certain transactions between do-
mestic banks, Congress did not include foreign banks out of a concern that a
foreign bank "can often engage in activities impermissible to domestic
banks," activities that could involve greater risk to the safety and soundness
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based this observation on clear legislative history that called
for denial of this exemption for foreign banks, because their
intra-company lending, even between banks, may indirectly
benefit non-banking activities.' 3 2
Immediately after the Board's issuance of the 1988 BCI
Letter, IRI indicated that it would provide the information nec-
essary for a BHCA application.'3 3 The Board offered to meet
with IRI representatives to discuss this issue.'3 4 The Italian
government, however, indicated that meetings of this kind
were not appropriate for a foreign government instrumental-
ity.' 35 BCI offered to pursue discussions on behalf of IRI, but
the Board rejected. this offer.'3 6 BCI representatives stated
that the application of the Act to IRI was a prime factor in its
abandonment of the Irving takeover attempt. 3 7 Commenta-
tors on the Board's decision believed that it had underesti-
of a domestic bank involved in a transaction with a foreign bank. Second,
Congress premised the two statutory exemptions in question in part upon
its belief that both banks involved in such a transaction would be under the
supervision and examination of state and/or federal bank supervisory au-
thorities.
Id. at 4-5 (citation omitted). In the Barclay's Letter, however, the Board made an
exception to this principle because of the unique circumstances surrounding the
transaction. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 4-5.
133. See Italian Firm to Provide Data on Irving Offer: Banca Commerciale Officer Ex-
presses Some Surprise on Request by the Fed, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1988, at 4, col. 1; Bartlett,
Italians Will Push Irving Bid: Information Sought by Fed is Promised; Options Are Studied,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1988, at DI, col. 6.
134. See Fraust, Did Fed Misread How Milan Bank Would React?, American Banker,
Aug. 31, 1988, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter Fraust, Did Fed Misread?]. This article noted
that
[a]ccording to one source close to the Italian bank, Banca Commerciale rep-
resentatives in the United States had offered to meet with the Fed in place of
its parent company, but Mr. Bradfield rejected this offer. The source said
the Italian government conglomerate had balked at being summoned to a
meeting by the Fed. "It's as if the Italian government were to say to the U.S.
Treasury, 'Come to Milan and talk to us,' the source said."
Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Bartlett, Italian Bank Ends Irving Bid: Bank of New York's Offer is Bolstered;
Other Suitors Sought, N. Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1988, at DI, col. 5. The Italian Govern-
ment felt it was inappropriate for the Board to require an Italian government instru-
mentality (IRI) to file with an application. Bartlett reported that
Banca Commerciale said yesterday, "As a matter of Italian law, I.R.I. is a
Government instrumentality and not a company and, therefore, it would be
inappropriate for it to file with the Fed." As a result, a spokesman said,
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mated the importance of the sovereignty issue to IRI and the
Italian government.
38
III. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES ARE
NOT "COMPANIES": THE NEED FOR STATUTORY
AMENDMENTS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
INSTRUMENTALITIES' BANK OWNERSHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES
BCI's attempt to acquire Irving was unprecedented: never
before had a foreign government instrumentality attempted to
acquire a large U.S. bank involved in extensive international
business. 3 9 The nature of this takeover attempt led the Board
to change its policy and to apply the Act to IRI.'40 The Board
exempted IRI's non-banking activities under section 4(c)(9),
attempting to reconcile U.S. banking regulatory goals with
IRI's governmental functions.' 4 ' The Board's use of that ex-
emption proposed an untenable isolation of Irving from its po-
tential Italian government affiliates.' 42 This isolation, would
have prevented Irving's financial assistance of IRI and the Ital-
Banca Commerciale notified Irving that it was terminating its agreement to
buy a controlling interest in the New York bank.
Id.
138. See Fraust, Did Fed Misread?, supra note 134, at 1. Fraust noted that
[t]he Fed was attempting to chart a middle course in the takeover battle.
But the Fed may have underestimated the importance of the sovereignty
issue to Irving's Italian bidder. "The Fed did not understand that they were
dealing with a government entity, not a company," said one lawyer close to
the source.
Id.
It was widely felt that the Commission of the European Communities would not
look favorably on this decision, which might, in response, limit U.S. entry into E.C.
banking markets. See Duffy, Backlash May Follow Fed Ruling on Italian Bidder: European
Community Could Limit U.S. Entry into Market in Wake of Irving Decision, American
Banker, Aug. 26, 1988, at 3, col. 4 [hereinafter Duffy, Backlash]. Members of the
Commission felt that the Board's decision in the 1988 BCI Letter could have wide
implications, especially if it was applied to other state-controlled banks. Id. (com-
ments of Robert Hull, Assistant Director of the European Commission's Directorate
for Financial Institutions).
139. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 3. Unlike BCI's earlier LITCO acquisi-
tion, its ownership of Irving could lead to extensive financial interrelationship with
the affiliates of Irving's foreign parent. Id.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 4-5.
142. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 5-6 (stringent restriction on manage-
ment and credit interrelationships).
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ian government's other instrumentalities. In effect, this isola-
tion would also hinder the economic development goals those
companies attempt to achieve.' 43 Although the restrictions of
the section 4(c)(9) exemption made for BCI and IRI would
have been limited to that acquisition, they are indicative of the
Board's position on foreign government instrumentalities' ac-
quisitions of large U.S. banks.' 44
The Board's application of the Act in the 1988 BCI Letter
extended not just to IRI, but to all banks owned by foreign
government instrumentalities. 45  Although no such instru-
mentality currently owns a U.S. bank, the potential for such
acquisitions in the future gives the letter policy implications
beyond the facts and circumstances of BCI's attempted take-
over of Irving. 146 The 1988 BCI Letter's application of the Act
makes it tantamount to a regulation, the issuance of which is
generally accompanied by a public comment process. 147 Sig-
143. See infra notes 175-198 and accompanying text.
144. See Duffy, Backlash, supra note 138, at 4 (describing European perception of
1988 BCI Letter's provisions).
145. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 7-8.
146. Id. at 7. The Board stated that: "This exemption [for non-banking activi-
ties] would continue for so long as these companies continue to meet the require-
ment in section 4(c)(9) that a majority of their business is conducted outside the
United States and they do not acquire control of a U.S. bank." Id. (emphasis added); see
Letter from Lane Grijns and Lawrence Uhlick, Institute of International Bankers to
William Rutledge, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (June 28, 1988) (copy on file at
Fordham International LawJournal office)[hereinafter IIB Letter]. The IIB Letter was
concerned with the precedential significance of the Board's decision on whether a
BHCA application would be required of IRI, and noted that
the Board's long-standing policy on foreign government ownership under
the BHCA is fundamentally sound and should. not be changed. If the Board
were nevertheless to decide to reconsider its established policy, the Institute
urges that it not do so in the context of an individual foreign bank's applica-
tion. Because of the significant implications of any change in that policy,
any such reconsideration should be conducted in a manner which affords all
parties whose interest would be affected, particularly foreign banks that are
state-owned and their foreign government owners, an opportunity to com-
ment on the basis for the current policy and the consequences of any change
to that policy. 0
Id. at 1-2; see Duffy, Backlash, supra note 138, at 3 (comments of Robert Hull).
147. See lIB Letter, supra note 146, at 1. International bankers in the United
States were concerned about a policy change being made in the context of a single
bank's application. Id. at 1. The IIB letter also noted that
[i]f the Board nevertheless decides to reconsider its established policy, we
urge that it not do so in this or any other application by an individual for-
eign bank applicant. Because of the significant implications of such a
change in policy for foreign governments and state-owned foreign commer-
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nificantly, the Board again requested congressional considera-
tion of the appropriate treatment under the BHCA of foreign
government instrumentalities' U.S. banking activities.' 48 The
lack of public input on these issues, the Board's request for
legislative consideration, and its reluctance to make a more lib-
eral section 4(c)(9) exemption in this situation, all point to the
need for an explicit statutory treatment of these issues.
A. The BHCA's Definition of "Company" Does Not Include Foreign
Government Instrumentalities
The Board's decision that foreign government instrumen-
talities having banking activities in the United States are in-
cluded under the BHCA's definition of "company" is mis-
guided. Conflicting inferences may be drawn from this defini-
tion and its applicability to foreign government
instrumentalities. 49 Because the BHCA's definition of "com-
pany" explains its meaning by an enumeration of private busi-
ness organizational forms, it does not acknowledge a distinc-
tion between foreign government instrumentalities and private
companies.15 0 The Board in the 1988 BCI Letter used a facial
analysis of the BHCA's "company" definition.' 5'
cial banks as well as for the foreign policy interests of the U.S., we would
urge that any review be noticed in the Federal Register, affording all interested
parties including the Institute an opportunity to formulate their comments
on the Board's view of the issue and how the Board might contemplate im-
plementing any change in policy. Consultations with foreign governmental
authorities from the countries affected would also appear to be appropriate.
In this connection, the Board's 1982 BCI Order emphasized the need
for more extensive analysis and broader participation in any further review
of the foreign governmentownership issue. As in 1982, such an opportu-
nity is not provided by the pending application. Indeed, the Federal Register
notice of BCI's application does not mention the foreign government con-
trol issue.
Id. at 5.
148. 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 7. The Board indicated its ongoing dis-
comfort with the government ownership issue by noting that "[tihe three year time
period provided to IRI before the Board again reviews the exemptions would also
allow time and opportunity for Congressional review of these issues raised by the
present case." Id.
149. See supra note 118 (describing positions of attorneys for BNY and BCI on
foreign governments as BHCA "companies").
150. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (discussing Board acknowl-
edgement that definition of "company" in BHCA does not include uniquely govern-
mental functions).
151. Compare supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (discussing Board analy-
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The Board based this analysis (1) on the lack of a specific
exemption for foreign government instrumentalities, (2) legis-
lative history suggesting that the enumerated exemptions from
the "company" definition are exclusive,1 2 and (3) Blue Island,
which is the only case offering an in-depth construction of that
definition.15 3 This reliance on the definition of "company" to
establish jurisdiction over foreign government instrumentali-
ties with a U.S. banking presence fails to recognize the unique
issues raised by such regulation.
The BHCA's closest analogue to foreign government in-
strumentalities is its exemption for domestic federal and state
government instrumentalities in its "company" definition.154
The BHCA does not govern these instrumentalities because
they are already regulated by governments. 155 Furthermore,
this exemption has seldom been applied because nationalized
banks are not found in the United States. 56 This exemption's
limitation to U.S. governmental instrumentalities does not by
negative inference indicate an intent to exclude foreign gov-
ernment instrumentalities. 57 Foreign bank holding compa-
nies of any kind were so uncommon in the United States in the
sis in late 1970's of status of foreign and non-federal/state governments as compa-
nies under BHCA in Histadrut and AINB Letters) with supra note 118 (discussing
1988 BCI Letter's analysis of foreign governments as "companies" under BHCA).
152. 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 3.
153. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing cases construing BHCA's
definition of "company").
154. See 1983 Memo, supra note 101, at 505. The appropriateness of the federal
and state government exception as a guide to addressing foreign government bank
holding companies was also pointed out in the Histadrut Letter, supra note 85, at 2.
155. See 1955 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-7.
156. A search of the Federal Reserve Bulletin has revealed no instance where this
exception has been applied in the context of U.S. government instrumentalities.
157. See Lichtenstein, supra note 40, at 917-18. In discussing the 1956 Act's ap-
plicability to foreign banks, Lichtenstein notes that
the Act as originally promulgated in 1956 contained neither recognition of
the problems of transnational banking nor any recognition of the extent to
which the Act, if made applicable to foreign bank holding companies, would
extend United States concepts of banking structure and regulation to the
foreign activities of foreign companies. In 1956, the Act's lack of recogni-
tion of the problem of foreign bank entry was hardly crucial: the multina-
tional banks that had entered the United States markets ... had chosen to
do so only in New York, California and Illinois. Those few foreign banks
covered by the pre-1970 two-bank test did not have non-bank subsidiaries
which would not fall within an exception to the apparent application of sec-
tion 4 to foreign subsidiaries.
Id. (citations omitted).
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mid-1950s that the original Act did not address them.15 8
Moreover, only domestically active organizations then quali-
fied as "banks" within the regulatory scope of the Act.' 59 Ex-
amined in this context, it is apparent that the BHCA's defini-
tion of "company" was developed to reach essentially private,
domestic enterprises. 60 Because of this limited focus, the defi-
nition does not take account of the motivations of foreign gov-
ernment instrumentalities that own banks as opposed to the
motivations of private investors.' 6 ' Nor does Blue Island, the
leading case construing this definition, afford additional clarifi-
cation on this point.' 62
The Blue Island case, which involved an ESOP and not a
foreign government instrumentality, determined that the
BHCA's usage of "company" covered any formalized structure
through which individual economic interests are combined for
common business objectives.' 6  Governments do not meet the
"individual economic interests" portion of this definition.'64
Additionally, the "common business objectives" part of this
definition is inapplicable to government organizations because
they are not a confederation of individuals that have common
158. See Pub. L. No. 511, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 134 (1956) (definition of "bank" ex-
cluded any organization which does not do business within the United States and
Edge Act corporations involved in exclusively foreign transactions).
159. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 4-5 (1955). Indicative of
the domestic orientation of the 1956 Act was its definition of "bank":
Section 2(c) of the bill as reported defines "bank" so as to exclude any
organization which does not do business within the United States. Thus,
technically any foreign banking subsidiary of a bank holding company would
be a nonbanking investment and would be required to be divested pursuant
to section 4(a) of the bill....
However, in order to make it unmistakably clear that foreign banking
subsidiaries are not subject to divestment, the committee ordered a new
subparagraph (8) to section 4(c) specifically exempting such subsidiaries.
Id.
160. Id.
161. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1988). Section 1841, by exempting U.S. govern-
ment instrumentalities views such organizations as distinct from private, profit-mak-
ing enterprises. See id.
162. See infra notes 163-65 (discussing inapplicability of Blue Island analysis to
foreign governments).
163. First Nat'l Bank of Blue Island Employee Stock Ownership Plan v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 802 F.2d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1986).
164. In the Histadrut Letter, supra note 85, at 1-2, and the AINB Letter, supra
note 92, at 2, there were acknowledgements that the benefits from the business en-
terprises of a government-like instrumentality benefitted the collective membership
of the government unit.
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business objectives.' 65 The Board's prior rulings on the status
of foreign government instrumentalities operating U.S. banks
acknowledged the inapplicability of the Act's definition of
"company" to these organizations, even when they were not a
division of a foreign government. 16 6
The descriptions of the governmental instrumentalities
exempt from BHCA jurisdiction in the Histadrut Letter and
the AINB Letter demonstrate how those instrumentalities di-
verge from this definition of "company" under the BHCA. 16 7
In each of these cases, the government instrumentality per-
formed a governmental function analogous to state and federal
government instrumentalities. Profits from its investments
were not distributed to members but were held for reinvest-
ment in new and existing enterprises or were intended to ben-
efit all members of the government unit regardless of owner-
ship interest.'6 Foreign government instrumentalities that
own U.S. banks diverge from the Act's definition of "com-
pany" because they do not financially benefit individual share-
holders. This divergence is due to their public, governmental
purposes, which distinguishes them from corporations, part-
nerships, and similar organizational structures. 169
Blue Island found that the "similar organizations" part of
the BHCA's "company" definition indicates legislative intent
165. BCI Memo II, supra note 117, at 10-12.
166. See Histadrut Letter, supra note 85, at 2 (noting that government-allied
trade union's holding company was "something other than a 'corporation, partner-
ship, business trust, association or similar organization' ").
167. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (discussing nature of govern-
mental functions).
168. Histadrut Letter, supra note 85, at 2; AINB Letter, supra note 92, at 2.
169. See First Nat'l Bank of Blue Island Employee Stock.Ownership Plan v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 802 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1986). The
Seventh Circuit's analysis of the status of ESOPs as business instrumentalities fo-
cused on their close relation to management and the individual benefit to sharehold-
ers. Id. at 294-95. The court stated that
[t]he function of ESOPs are business-related. ESOPs, like other retirement
plans, provide for deferred compensation. ESOPs are established by man-
agement, and typically administered by management, as a method of distrib-
uting benefits to the companies' employees in the form of stock. The under-
lying trust invests the employer contributions primarily in the employer's
stock. Thus the ESOP is closely related to the business in which it is estab-
lished. It provides a deferred compensation plan and investment program
for employees, as well as an attractive method of financing for employers.
Id.; see BCI Memo II, supra note 118, at 20 (discussing how ESOPs effect this distribu-
tion to individual shareholders, but governments do not).
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to encompass all entities that can maintain long-term control
of a bank.' 70 Foreign government instrumentalities, however,
do not resemble corporations, partnerships, or business
trusts.' 7 ' Under the ejusdem generis principle of statutory con-
struction, "similar organizations" in the BHCA's definition of
"company" cannot include foreign government instrumentali-
ties. 172 The Board viewed Blue Island as dispositive of whether
"similar organizations" includes foreign government instru-
mentalities, despite the fact that these instrumentalities do not
resemble the enumerated items in the definition. This sug-
gests that regulatory comity is secondary to a statutory man-
date that the Board must regulate every institution that can
maintain long term control of a bank in the same fashion as a
private, domestic company.'7 " This interpretation led to an
application of the BHCA to foreign government-owned U.S.
bank subsidiaries that is inconsistent with the Act's goal of
minimum extraterritorial effect in its application to foreign
banking activities. Relying on the Act's definition of "com-
pany," as the Board did in the 1988 BCI Letter, to dictate a
regulatory approach to foreign government instrumentalities'
banking subsidiaries within and outside the United States, does
not recognize the divergent goals and purposes of those in-
strumentalities, from those of privately owned enterprises.
Failure to accord them a regulatory exemption equivalent to
that available to domestic sovereign instrumentalities that con-
duct banking activities also raises questions of what "national
treatment" means in this context.
170. Blue Island, 802 F.2d at 294.
171. See BCI Memo II, supra note 118, at 10-13.
172. See id. at 10-13, 18-21; see also SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.18 (1975) (application of ejusdem generis principle). The principle of ejusdem
generis is defined as "a rule of statutory construction, generally accepted by both state
and federal courts, that where general words follow enumerations of particular
classes or persons or things, the general words shall be construed as applicable only
to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as those enumerated." GIFIS,
L.Aw DICTIONARY (1975).
173. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 2-3. Indicative of the Board's discom-
fort with this position is its desire that Congress review the applicability of the BHCA
to foreign governments during the three-year period during which it would have ex-
empted IRI's non-banking activities under section 4(c)(9). Id. at 7.
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B. The Interaction Between Banking and Non-Banking Activities of
Foreign Government Instrumentalities Can Be a Sovereign
Activity
A meaningful accommodation of the banking subsidiaries
of foreign government instrumentalities in the United States
must allow for a limited amount of financial interaction be-
tween their non-banking activities and their U.S. banking sub-
sidiaries. Under the 1988 BCI Letter's approach, the Board
would have allowed co-existence of foreign governments'
banking and non-banking activities within and outside the
United States, but would have allowed no financial interaction
between those activities. 174 This does not acknowledge the im-
portance to governments of financial interaction between these
activities.' 75 This approach to foreign government instrumen-
talities' banking subsidiaries in the United States does not
comport with the commercial reasons that private and govern-
ment bank holding companies make investments in subsidiar-
ies.' 76 If a foreign government instrumentality invests capital
in acquiring a U.S. bank, it is unreasonable to expect it to re-
frain completely from financial transactions with its fellow gov-
ernment-owned companies. 77 The principles of U.S. banking
regulations can be applied without the degree of isolation im-
posed in the 1988 BCI Letter.
In addition, this restriction contravenes Congress' desire
for regulatory comity, expressed in the legislative histories of
both section 4(c)(9) and section 2(h)(2), the BHCA's two pro-
visions allowing foreign banks exemptions for non-banking ac-
tivities. 78 The Board equated foreign government instrumen-
174. See id. at 5-6.
175. See id. at 5-6. These restrictions address most aspects of the ways in which a
bank holding company would interact with its banking affiliates-management, finan-
cial assistance, and cross-marketing. Id. These place nearly total isolation between
the holding company and the banking affiliate.
176. See I. Sw^RY, CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS AND BANK HOLDING COM-
PANIES 64-66 (1980) (describing rationale for bank holding company's acquisition of
non-banking business entities); see also M.JESSEE, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 78-81 (1977) (describing rationale behind
bank holding companies' acquisition practices).
177. See I. SwARY, supra note 176, at 64-66; M.JESSEE, supra note 176, at 78-81;
see also S. HOLLAND, supra note 3, at 199-200.
178. See Burns Comments, supra note 50; Treasury Letter, supra note 50; see also
1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67. The prohibition on lending is harsher than the
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talities with conventional, privately owned companies under
the Act's definition of "company."' 79 This approach does not
acknowledge the sovereign component of foreign government
instrumentalities' banking activities. 80 The Board's 1983
analysis of the BHCA's applicability to foreign governments
made analogies to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the
"FSIA").'8 This legislation exempts foreign sovereigns from
federal jurisdiction but allows jurisdiction over foreign govern-
ments' commercial activities in the United States.18 2  The
Board's position was that the FSIA's view of foreign govern-
ments' commercial activities supports Board regulation of for-
eign government instrumentalities' U.S. banking activities.'
restrictions applicable through section 23A to domestic and foreign private bank
holding companies. See supra note 23 (noting section 23A's lending limits).
179. 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 3-4.
180. See 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 9 (considering foreign gov-
ernments as "companies" could impinge on government's sovereign functions by
restricting their non-banking activities).
181. See 1983 Memo, supra note 101, at 507-08. The Board invoked the FSIA in
support of its argument that it had jurisdiction over foreign government entities. Id.
at 507. The Board stated:
In addition, it is well recognized in U.S. and international law that when a
government acts in a commercial capacity, it may lose its claim to sover-
eignty and thus immunity from the law. This principle has been codified by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act [28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.] which pro-
vides that a foreign state is not considered immune from suit where an ac-
tion is based on commercial activity in the United States. Thus, foreign gov-
ernments and foreign government-owned corporations need not be ex-
cluded from the provisions of the BHCA solely because of their sovereign
status.
Id. at 507-08.
182. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1988); 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) (defining extent of immunity). The scope of federal court
jurisdiction over foreign governments is set forth in section 1605(a)(2), which pro-
vides that
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.
183. See 1983 Memo, supra note 101. The 1983 Memo invoked the FSIA as a
justification for Board jurisdiction over foreign government bank holding companies:
[The argument that foreign governments fall within BHCAjurisdiction] may
1989-1990] BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
This analogy, however, avoided a key issue. Cases consid-
ering the application of the FSIA have noted the conflict be-
tween between "commercial" activities giving rise to FSIA ju-
risdiction and "governmental" activities integral to a govern-
ment's sovereignty and, thus, outside FSIAjurisdiction. t8 4 For
example, in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers v. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,'85 an
antitrust case alleging price-fixing by the OPEC member
states, the district court held that price controls on exports of
these states' natural resources were outside FSIA jurisdic-
tion.1 8 6 The court reasoned that controls of this kind, while
appearing merely commercial, were inherently governmental
activities that conserved the states' natural resources and were
be further supported by examining analogous statutes and the reasoning of
the courts in applying those laws to governments or governmental entities.
In addition it is well recognized in U.S. and international law that when a
government acts in a commercial capacity, it may lose its claim to sover-
eignty and thus immunity from the law. This principle has been codified in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ....
Id. at 508.
184. See MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1985); Claco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petro-
leum, Inc., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. The Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), fJ'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981). See generally C. EBENROTH, BANKING ON THE ACT OF STATE (1985).
Ebenroth discusses the ongoing tension between the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act and act of state doctrine. Id. He discusses that tension in the context of several
cases involving non-U.S. government freezing of assets allocated to repayment of
debts incurred by non-U.S. government taking such action. Id.
185. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
186. Id. International Machinists, an antitrust case challenging OPEC's alleged
price fixing of crude oil prices, made a distinction between "commercial" and "gov-
ernmental" activities. The district court opinion found that such price control was a
sovereign activity not giving rise to jurisdiction under the FSIA. The court stated
that
[i]t is clear that the nature of the activity engaged in by each of these OPEC
member countries is the establishment by a sovereign state of the terms and
conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource-to wit, crude oil-
from its territory ....
The control over a nation's natural resources stems from the nature of
sovereignty. By necessity and by traditional recognition, each nation is its
own master in respect to its physical attributes. The defendants' control
over their oil resources is an especially sovereign function because oil, as
their primary, if not sole, revenue-producing resource, is crucial to the wel-
fare of their nations' peoples.
Id. at 567-68.
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thus exempt under the act of state doctrine. 8 7
This judicial deference to commercial means of imple-
menting foreign government policy suggests that the U.S.
banking activities of foreign government instrumentalities can
have a governmental component meriting a similar regulatory
deference. The Italian government's broad-ranging invest-
ments in varied industries through IRI have achieved eco-
nomic development goals that could be considered the result
of "governmental" activities. 88 IRI has systematically devel-
oped the Italian steel, telephone, and automobile industries. 89
Financial interaction between government-owned banks and
other government enterprises is a means of achieving these
goals.' 90 In this context, intra-company lending to non-bank-
187. Id.; see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit rejected juris-
diction on different grounds. Id. at 1358. It reasoned that
[c]onsideration of their (i.e., the OPEC nations) sovereignty cannot be sepa-
rated from their near total dependence upon oil. We find that these con-
cerns are appropriately addressed by application of the act of state doctrine
The act of state doctrine declares that a United States court will not
adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which would require the court to
judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state .... [iut requires that
the courts defer to the legislative and executive branches when those
branches are better equipped to resolve a politically sensitive question....
Id.
188. See Pontarollo, supra note 99, at 25; see also Graziadei Opinion, spra note
118, at 4. The Graziadei Opinion noted that
[tihe mere fact that IRI is structured to operate in its external activities in
the field of the civil law is a consequence of the provisions of Art. 41 of the
Italian Constitution which separated the Government's entrepreneurial ac-
tivities from the sovereign acts of the Government but detracts nothing
from the basic purpose of IRI as an instrumentality to act in furtherance of
purposes of a public and social interest. IRI, like all enti autonomi di gestione, is
not vested with regulatory powers but.., is subject to the supervision of the
Ministry of State Participations which conveys to IRI appropriate directives
as dictated by the Government and in particular by the Interministerial
Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE).
Id.
189. See Pontarollo, supra note 99, at 25; see also IRI 1987 YEARBOOK at 10-11
(explanation of IRI's history and range of activities) (copy on file at Fordham Interna-
tional LawJournal office). See generally S. HOLLAND, supra note 3 (giving extensive dis-
cussion of IRI's history).
190. See IRI 1987 YEARBOOK, supra note 189, at 10. The genesis of IRI occurred
when the Italian government acquired three large commercial banks that failed dur-
ing the Great Depression. The IRI Yearbook notes that:
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ing activities may be a "governmental" activity that merits a
flexible jurisdictional approach.
The Board has expressed concerns that foreign govern-
ment instrumentalities' combination of banking and non-bank-
ing activities in the United States might conflict with the
BHCA's goal of separating banking and commerce, because
foreign governments, by their nature, are not primarily in-
volved in the banking business.' 9 ' It is also concerned that
such instrumentalities will not be a source of financial and
managerial strength to their U.S. affiliates. i 92 These concerns
The commercial banks had been a major force in financing the coun-
try's industrial development, to a large extent through long-term loans and
the acquisition of holdings, and these methods had been applied mainly in
favour of companies operating in capital intensive industries.
The disproportion between the small amount of private venture capital
available and the huge investments required in a number of areas of indus-
try because of technological development and, from 1915 to 1918, because
of the war, had led the commercial banks to take such a big hand in the
Italian industrial system that by the end of the First World War they had
practically taken over a number of major companies and thus a high propor-
tion of their capital was locked up.
In this situation, IRI was incorporated as a temporary institution with
the aim of rehabilitating struggling banks by acquiring their holdings ....
[in] 1937 IRI was converted to a permanent body for the management of
industrial companies under state shareholding.
Id.; see S. HOLLAND, supra note 3. Holland notes that IRI has heavy short-term bor-
rowing needs, which between 1958 and 1969 amounted to one-tenth of IRI's total
financial requirements. Id. at 199-200. He notes that the financial relationships be-
tween banking and non-banking companies within IRI are not excessive or overly
preferential:
One conclusion which certainly should not be drawn from the level of IRI's
short-term borrowing is that it gained preferential rates from its own banks.
In a recent examination of this question Alberto Bertoni concluded that 'it
does not appear that their particular position (IRI banks) has favoured the
establishment of connections which varied from normal banking practice.'
As evidence for this he cites the fact that in December 1966 only 12.6% of
total lending by the three main IRI banks (Banca Commerciale, Credito
Italiano, and Banco di Roma) was to public enterprise as a whole .... He
allows that this does not exclude the presumption that IRI banks may show
'greater solicitude' towards the firms of the Group than for the rest of their
clientele, but emphasizes that, such preference does not concern the interest
rates demanded from firms so much as possible precedence in the granting
of credit in the event of restrictions imposing a degree of rationing. In fact
this is a more qualified judgement than strictly necessary.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
191. See 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5-7 (noting that no govern-
ment could be considered primarily involved in banking).
192. Id. at 15.
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also impact on the Board's views regarding intra-company
lending between U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks and their
parent companies' non-banking activities. The Board has ad-
dressed the issue of non-banking activities by allowing private
foreign bank holding companies to maintain their non-banking
activities in the United States only when the bank holding com-
pany is primarily involved in the banking business.' Regard-
ing intra-company lending, the Board has observed that sec-
tion 23A's exemption for transactions between banks within a
common' bank holding company does not generally apply to
foreign bank holding companies because of their involvement
in non-banking activities. 94 These positions acknowledge the
dangers inherent in any completely unregulated intra-company
lending between foreign banks and their U.S. affiliates.
The dangers posed by the financial interrelationship of
banking and non-banking activities when a foreign government
instrumentality acquires a large U.S. bank can be controlled by
means less drastic than a complete prohibition of intra-com-
pany lending.195 Non-application of section 23A to lending re-
lationships between the U.S. banking presences and the for-
eign government instrumentalities that own them would repre-
sent too deferential a regulatory approach. This approach
would give the banking subsidiaries of foreign government in-
strumentalities a substantial competitive advantage over simi-
larly situated domestic and foreign private institutions. 196 This
could endanger U.S. bank depositors' funds.' 9 7 To permit
lending by such banks within the parameters of section 23A,
however-especially when applied to transactions with all the
foreign government's instrumentalities-would limit intra-
company lending to an amount equivalent to that permissible
193. Id. at 7.
194. See Barclay's Letter, supra note 131, at 4-5.
195. See 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 424, 426; BCI Memo, supra note 104,
at 7-12. The 1982 BCI Order recognized this, and relied on section 23A to shield
LITCO's banking operations from IRI's-and the Italian government's-non-bank-
ing affiliates. 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 426.
196. See BCI Memo, supra note 104. BCI argued that due to the "company"
definition of Federal Reserve Act section 23A, affiliates of the Italian government
other than those of IRI would not be subject to that section's lending restrictions. Id.
at 7-12.
197. See Miles, supra note 27, at 480-82 (discussing origin of section 23A in con-
text of Depression-era bank failures).
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to U.S. and privately held foreign bank holding companies.
This limitation would restrain any potential for excessive com-
petitive advantage and would achieve the protective goals of
U.S. banking regulation. At the same time, this limitation
would allow foreign government instrumentalities to achieve
their economic development objectives through a controlled
amount of intra-company lending between their U.S. banking
affiliates and their other activities both inside and outside the
United States.' 98
C. Proposals for Statutory Change
The BHCA should be amended in several ways to address
the U.S. banking activities of foreign government instrumen-
talities. The general nature and extent of regulatory exemp-
tions for non-banking activities and managerial interrelation-
ships for their U.S. banking activities should be provided for in
the BHCA. There should be a definition addressing foreign
government instrumentalities that parallels the BHCA's defini-
tion of "company." This definition should specify what parts
of the foreign government's instrumentality are analogous to
the "bank holding company." An over-broad definition of that
term could make the application process unwieldy and oner-
ous.' For example, if IRI were required to submit a Board
application, it would have to report financial information on
approximately 100 companies, if the definition of the govern-
ment instrumentality was not narrowly defined. °0 If the Board
held that an entire foreign government was the equivalent of a
"holding company," even greater difficulties in reporting
could result, because the government may hold interests in
198. See 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 425. This would entail a definition of
"company" similar in effect to the agreement made between the Board and BCI in
the 1982 BCI Order. See BCI Memo, supra note 104, at 7-12. In the 1982 BCI Order,
all Italian government entities were "affiliates" of LITCO for the purposes of Federal
Reserve Act section 23A. 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 425.
199. See BCI Memo II, supra note 118, at 40-41 (discussing difficulties involved
with BHCA application and reporting requirements).
200. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 1-2; see also IRI 1987 YEARBOOK, supra
note 189 (description of range of IRI subsidiaries' activities). Since BCI withdrew its
takeover offer, the practical aspects of the application process were not tested by an
actual application. One commentator at the time of the 1988 BCI Letter noted that it
was doubtful if IRI would-or could-comply with the necessary reporting process.
See Italian Firm to Provide Data on Irving Offer; Banca Commerciale Officer Expresses Some
Surprise on Request by the Fed, Wall St.J., Aug. 23, 1988, at 4, cols. 1-2.
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many companies. 2° ' A more effective approach would be to
scrutinize the acquiring government banking instrumentality
and its fellow government-owned banks, which in the case of
the 1988 Irving acquisition, would have been BCI and its IRI-
affiliated banks. 2  The Board should direct particular inquiry
towards these institutions' management and credit interrela-
tionships with other government instrumentalities. Complete
disclosure of this information should be a part of any acquisi-
tion application made to the Board. 0 Considering the "com-
pany" as the group of banks owned by the foreign government
would also avoid any interstate branching issues that might
arise. Two or more separate government owned banks could
not, under this definition, operate separate subsidiaries in the
U.S.
As a complement to a restrictive view of the foreign gov-
ernment "company" under the BHCA, a broad definition of
the foreign government instrumentality should be added to
section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, paralleling its defini-
tion of "company." Section 23A, like the BHCA,204 defines
"company" in terms of corporations, partnerships, associa-
tions, or similar organizations, none of which resemble gov-
ernments.20 5 If the BHCA's definition of "company," how-
ever, is construed to include foreign government instrumental-
ities, the term "company" in section 23A should also embrace
such instrumentalities and allow lending between them and
their U.S. subsidiary banks. 6
The present deficiency of section 23A's definition of
''company" is that the scope of its application to governmental
organizations is unclear. A broad definition of "company"
would control the financial interaction between the foreign
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Compagnie Financiere de Suez, supra note 108 (acquiring government-
owned bank, and not all French government-owned industries, was instrumentality
required to apply). BCI had tried to suggest such an approach at the time of the
1988 BCI Letter, but the Board would not meet with BCI, and insisted on meeting
with IRI. See Fraust, Did Fed Misread?, supra note 134, at 1.
204. Compare supra note 31 (definition of "company" in BHCA) with supra note
23 (definition of "company" in 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988)).
205. See BCI Memo, supra note 104, at 7-12.
206. Compare supra note 31 ("company" definition in BHCA) with supra note 23
(definition of "company" in 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988)).
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government instrumentality owning a U.S. bank, the foreign
government's other enterprises, and the government's com-
mercial affiliates in the United States.2 °7 This amendment
should specify that all government-owned enterprises are part
of the holding "company" and thus subject to section 23A's
lending restrictions. 20  For example, in the case of IRI, loans
to all Italian government instrumentalities, not just to IRI,
would be subject to section 23A's lending restrictions.20 9
This approach, which was adopted by the Board in the
1982 BCI Order, is the most prudent approach. It acknowl-
edges that the foreign government instrumentality's manage-
ment could be influenced by broader government financial
pressures.21 0 This influence could lead to extensive lending to
government instrumentalities other than that which owns the
U.S. bank, and possible endangerment of the U.S. bank's re-
sources.2 1 ' The current definition of "company" in section
23A does not give the Board clear guidance on how to address
this issue in the context of foreign governments. That defini-
tion's limitation to corporations and similar organizations does
not articulate which parts of foreign government instrumental-
ities may be "affiliates" to which section 23A's lending restric-
tions apply. 2 Amendment of section 23A to cover explicitly
foreign government instrumentalities would give the Board
207. See 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96; see also BCI Memo, supra note 104 at
11-12 (discussing Board's use, in 1982 BC! Order, of expansive definition of "affili-
ate" in context of foreign governments).
208. 1982 BC! Order, supra note 96, at 424, 426; see BCI Memo, supra note 104,
at 7-12.
209. 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 424, 426.
210. Commentators on the liberalization of non-banking restrictions for U.S.
non-banking holding companies have noted that application of section 23A would
limit imprudent lending between banks and their non-banking affiliates, thus recon-
ciling the prudential concerns of the Glass-Steagall Act with a wider range of permis-
sible activities for bank holding companies. See Miles, supra note 27; see also Long-
streth, Glass-Steagall: The Casefor Repeal, 31 N.Y.L. Sen. L. REV. 281 (1986); O'Brien,
Financial Deregulation: The Securities Industry Perspective, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 271
(1986).
211. See 1982 BCI Order, supra note 96, at 426. The Board noted, regarding
financial problems posed by foreign government-owned banks' non-conformance
with BHCA's non-banking restrictions, its belief that "the application of section 23A
of the Federal Reserve Act, as described above, will make a contribution towards
limiting the potential for actions inconsistent with the policies of the Act [the
BHCA]." Id.
212. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (definition of "company" in sec-
tion 23A).
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clear statutory guidance in regulating foreign government in-
strumentalities' financial interrelationships with their U.S.
banking subsidiaries.
An amendment of section 23A should also provide for a
reporting process to monitor the level and nature of intra-
company lending.2 1 3 The 1988 BCI Letter exempted IRI from
the BHCA's reporting requirements, which includes a report
of the intra-company transactions between foreign banking or-
ganizations and their U.S. banking subsidiaries. 1 4 Because of
the Board's unique status as both a government agency and a
federation of private banks, foreign governments might be re-
luctant to comply with Board-imposed reporting requirements
without express statutory authority. 21 5 For this reason, report-
ing requirements should be provided for by statute. This ap-
proach to intra-company lending would address the central
concern of allowing a government instrumentality involved
primarily in non-banking activities to own a U.S. bank subsidi-
ary, specifically, the danger that the U.S. bank's assets will be
imprudently channeled into non-banking activities.
CONCLUSION
Capital markets are becoming increasingly international-
ized, and less developed economies often use government con-
trolled banking instrumentalities as a means of participating in
those markets. In this context, regulatory comity in the treat-
ment of partially or totally government-owned banking instru-
mentalities will become an increasingly important considera-
tion. To avoid retaliatory regulation against U.S. banks and to
create a favorable climate for U.S. investment outside the
United States, a liberal treatment of foreign government in-
strumentalities' U.S. banking activities is desirable. This is
particularly true in the case of Eastern Europe, where major
banks are government-owned. Amendment of the BHCA and
Federal Reserve Act section 23A to address the status of for-
213. See P. HELLER, supra note 54, § 1.06(3) (describing BHCA's reporting re-
quirements, which include an annual report (Form FR Y-7), and a Report of In-
tercompany Transactions of Foreign Banking Organizations and their U.S. Bank Sub-
sidiaries (Form FR-Y8f)). Id.
214. See 1988 BCI Letter, supra note 7, at 7.
215. See 1983 Staff Memorandum, supra note 4, at 10; see also BCI Memo II, supra
note 104, at 41.
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eign government bank holding companies is an integral step in
avoiding potential incursions on the sovereign financial activi-
ties of foreign governments.
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